Consumer Payment Products and Systems: The Need for Uniformity and the Risk of Political Defeat by Budnitz, Mark E.
Georgia State University College of Law
Reading Room
Faculty Publications By Year Faculty Publications
1-1-2005
Consumer Payment Products and Systems: The
Need for Uniformity and the Risk of Political
Defeat
Mark E. Budnitz
Georgia State University College of Law, mbudnitz@gsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/faculty_pub
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, and the
Litigation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications By Year by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark E. Budnitz, Consumer Payment Products and Systems: The Need for Uniformity and the Risk of Political Defeat, 24 Ann. Rev.
Banking & Fin. L. 247 (2005).
CONSUMER PAYMENT PRODUCTS AND SYSTEMS:
THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY AND THE RISK OF
POLITICAL DEFEAT
MARK E. BUDNITZ"
1. Introduction
II. A Case Study of the Need for Uniformity: Check 21
III. Many Sources of Consumer Confusion: The Murky World of Payment
Systems and Payment Products
A. Payment Systems
1. Electronic Fund Transfers
2. Check 21 and the Expedited Funds Availability Act
B. Payment Products
1. Telephone Checks
2. Stored Value Cards: New Products, Little Law
C. Consumer Confusion: Deciphering the Legal Landscape
1. Disclosures and Notices of Rights
2. Liability for Unauthorized Use and Error Resolution
3. Similar Problems of Non-Uniformity in the Context of
Payment Systems
IV. A Proposed Uniform Law
A. General Principles
B. Specific Recommendations
C. Preemption
D. The Consumer's Dilemma: Uniformity May Reduce Consumer
Protection
V. Conclusion
. Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law; B.A., Dartmouth Col-
lege; J.D., Harvard Law School. I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of
Jeffrey Morton Harvey. I also thank Georgia State University College of Law for
its support.
ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW [Vol. 24: 247
I. Introduction
Consumers are usually in conflict with the payments industry over
government regulation. They may find common ground, however, in
the need for uniformity. As this article demonstrates, the development
of new payment systems and recent proliferation of new payment
products ' have created a complex and confusing marketplace in which
consumers cannot adequately understand their rights and responsibili-
ties. This article examines the need for a uniform federal law that
would mandate minimum consumer protection standards in statutes
governing payment products and systems.
Part II outlines the various payments systems triggered by use of
an old payment product, the check. Part III then examines two payment
products that are especially popular among consumers, the telephone
check and stored value card, and compares them to older products in
terms of risks and benefits to consumers. Part III also examines the
different laws and regulations that govern each payment product and
system as well as rules issued by the National Automated Clearing-
house ("NACHA"), a private rule-making association. This part
demonstrates that, as a consequence of piecemeal legislation, there are
vast discrepancies in the responsibilities placed upon and the protec-
tions offered to consumers resulting in tremendous confusion for
consumers.
Part IV proposes enactment of a uniform federal law to impose
minimum standards for payment products and systems to ensure
essential rights for consumers. This article takes the position that a
uniform law should require meaningful disclosures of rights, risks, and
responsibilities. Serious issues arise, however, in drafting and defining
such standards. How minimal should the requirements be? If the
standards are too low, they will not provide meaningful protection.
But if they are too high and unduly detailed, there will be many
complicated operational problems for financial institutions because of
1 "Payment products" refer to devices used to authorize and enable a payment to
be made. Examples include checks, credit cards, debit cards, and stored value cards
such as prepaid gift and phone cards. "Payment systems" refer to the various systems
used to process the payments, such as the check processing system and the Automated
Clearing House Network that processes most electronic fund transfers.
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the great variety of products and systems that are currently in place
or will be developed in the future. Furthermore, to what extent should
a uniform federal law preempt state law? Should states be free to enact
protective legislation that goes beyond what the federal law requires?
Doing so would impose heavy burdens upon financial institutions and
be inconsistent with uniformity. On the other hand, there are many
benefits to permitting states to bestow additional protection upon the
consumers within their borders. For one, states can better take account
of the special characteristics of their population, such as numerous
immigrants or elderly residents. State experimentation also can help
determine which approaches might be worth legislating at a federal
level. Finally, any push for a uniform law should consider the risk
of doing further harm to consumer welfare. Faced with competing
interests, Congress could enact a uniform law which provides inade-
quate substantive protections. The proposed recommendations in Part
IV attempt to weigh and balance these considerations.
H. A Case Study of the Need for Uniformity: Check 21
The recently enacted Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act 2
("Check 21") illustrates the need for uniformity at the federal level.
This statute does not regulate a new payment product; rather, it is new
legislation to regulate an old product, the ordinary paper check. It has
long been a policy of the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") to establish
a payment system that is entirely electronic. 3 However, since consum-
ers still use checks extensively, 4 Congress and the FRB decided to
use the check processing system as a transitional step to facilitate
electronic transfer of payments. 5 Check 21 does this by establishing
2 Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 108-100, 117 Stat. 1177
(2003) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5018 (2000) [hereinafter Check
21].
3 See Alan Greenspan, Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan at the Fed. Reserve
Payments Sys. Dev. Comm., 2003 Conference (Oct. 29, 2003), available at
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/ 2003/20031029/default.htm ("[T]he
U.S. government is actively working on new technologies and services to increase
the use of electronics in both its payments and collections."); Andrea S. Klein, Putting
All Payment Data in One Place, AM. BANKER, Apr. 23, 2004, at 11 ('The Check
21 Act, enacted by Congress and the Federal Reserve, begins the process of moving
to a paperless environment.").
4 In the year 2000, consumers wrote checks in 26% of all transactions in which
consumers did not pay with cash. RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 5 (2d ed. 2003). This amounted to 43% of all dollars spent
by consumer. Id.
5 See Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks, 69 Fed. Reg. 47,290, 47,290
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legal rules that encourage banks to use electronic image exchange
resulting in quicker and more efficient processing. 6
For purposes of understanding Check 21, consumers can be divided
into two groups. 7 In one group are consumers who have agreed not
to have their checks returned with their monthly statements. 8 Their
checks are "truncated" - that is, stored by a financial institution,
usually their own bank. Instead of receiving original paper cancelled
checks, these consumers will have a record of their check either in
a carbonized copy that is produced when they write the original, or
in an image of the check that is returned with the monthly statement.
The second group consists of consumers who have not agreed to
truncation of their checks and, until Check 21, whose original checks
were returned with their statement. Under Check 21, these customers
will not receive an original check with their statement if, in the course
of processing that check, a financial institution has converted the paper
original into an electronic image. Instead, these consumers have a right
to be provided a "substitute check," a new instrument mandated by
Check 21.9 Financial institutions are required to give these consumers
a consumer awareness notice explaining the new law and the substitute
check. 10
Pursuant to Check 21, an original paper check could be changed
to a digital image, which in turn could be converted to a paper
substitute check." Because Congress recognized that errors could
occur when checks are processed in this manner, 12 the law grants those
(August 4, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 229) (describing the need for Check
21 in order to increase the efficiency of check processing) [hereinafter Check 21 Final
Rule].
6 See Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks, 12 C.F.R. § 229 (2005). See
generally Check 21 Final Rule, supra note 5.
7 Check 21 applies generally to both consumers and non-consumers. This article
discusses Check 21 only in regard to those provisions that pertain to consumers.
8 Check truncation is authorized under U.C.C. §§ 4-406(a), (b) (2002). An esti-
mated 59% of bank customers received their canceled checks with their bank
statements; the remaining 41% have agreed to truncation. Banks Prepared for Check
21, but What About Their Customers?, ITEM PROCESSING REP. No. 15-18, July 1,
2004 (reporting on a 2003 Global Concepts study).
9 Consumers who have agreed to truncation have no right to receive substitute checks.
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 229.51, 229.52; Check 21 Final Rule, supra note 5, at 47,301.
10 12 U.S.C. § 5011 (2000).
11 See 12 C.F.R. §§ 229.51, 229.52; Check 21 Final Rule, supra note 5, at 47,323.
12 Errors include multiple debits generated from one original paper check because
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consumers who have been provided with a substitute check the right
to submit a claim to the bank and require it to investigate the claim. 13
If the bank cannot determine the validity of the claim within ten days,
it must recredit the consumer's account. 14 Consumers who have
agreed to have their checks truncated have no right to be provided
a substitute check. Therefore, if the bank does not voluntarily give
them a substitute check, they have no recredit right. 15
Until Check 21, the law regulating check transactions consisted
primarily of state-enacted versions of the Uniform Commercial Code
(the "UCC").16 Unlike Check 21, the UCC contains no required
investigation and recredit. In fact, except in two very narrow recent
amendments not yet fully adopted by any state, the UCC check
provisions contain no provisions that apply explicitly to consumers. 17
In contrast, Check 21 includes some important, although very limited
consumer protections, including the recredit right discussed briefly
above. 18 The Check 21 recredit right is similar to that provided in
the Electronic Fund Transfers Act (the "EFTA"). 19 This is a promising
of the existence of the original, electronic images, and substitute checks. The FRB
has acknowledged the potential for such errors. See Check 21 Final Rule, supra note
5, at 47,323-24; Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks, 69 Fed. Reg. 1470,
1496-97, 1498 (proposed Jan. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Check 21 Proposed Rule].
13 12 U.S.C. § 5006.
14 The financial institution is required to recredit the consumer's account only if
the institution cannot resolve the consumer's complaint within ten days, and only for
certain types of problems related to creation of the substitute check. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 5007. The maximum amount of the recredit is $2500 or the amount of the substitute
check, whichever is less, unless the financial institution still cannot resolve the
complaint after forty-five calendar days, at which any balance over the initial $2500
must be recredited. Check 21 Final Rule, supra note 5, at 47,313.
15 See Mark E. Budnitz, The Check 21 Challenge: Will Banks Take Advantage of Con-
sumers?, 58 Consumer Finance Law Quarterly Rep. 369 (2004) (describing how Check
21 provides opportunities for banks to provide consumers more protection than the
Act requires).
16 An exception is the Expedited Funds Availability Act and Regulation CC, ensur-
ing that depositors have relatively prompt access to funds from checks. See discussion
infra Part III.A.2. One provision of Check 21 requires the FRB to issue a report
recommending whether funds can be made available more promptly as a result of
the speedier check processing that should result from Check 21. Id. § 5015.
17 See U.C.C. § 3-305(e) (2002) (extends the effect of the FTC Holder Rule, 16
C.F.R. pt. 433 (2005), to promissory notes that do not include the required FTC
legend). See discussion infra Part III.B.I (describing telephone checks).
18 12 U.S.C. § 5006.
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 1693f. An importance difference between Check 21 and the
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development for consumers. Despite the UCC's almost universal
refusal to include consumer protection, 20 consumers are gaining some
protection in certain check transactions through Regulation CC ("Reg.
CC") and Check 21.21 One might call this creeping limited consumer
protection. Incremental protectionist developments should make it
easier in the future for consumer advocates to successfully demand
that prospective legislation in the payments area include consumer
protection, in contrast to the UCC model. Any other approach would
be a step backwards.
While the inclusion of consumer protection in Check 21 bodes well
for consumers, it also undoubtedly will result in consumer confu-
sion. 22 For example, consumers who discover errors in check transac-
tions involving substitute checks have a right to an investigation and
a recredit; however, this right applies only to consumers who have
not agreed to truncation. 23 Others do not have the right to a recredit
of funds even though their accounts may be debited erroneously in
transactions involving substitute checks. 24 In addition, consumers'
EFTA is that under Check 21 the recredit right only applies to a maximum of $2500
per substitute check if the bank cannot determine within ten days whether the
consumer's claim for a recredit is valid. The balance over $2500 is credited only after
forty-five days if the bank's investigation is still pending. 12 U.S.C. § 5006(c)(2)(B).
The EFTA includes no maximum cap on the amount the bank must recredit if the
bank cannot determine the validity of the consumer's claim within ten days. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1693f(c).
20 Fred H. Miller, U.C.C. Articles 3, 4 and 4A: A Study in Process and Scope,
42 ALA. L. REV. 405, 412-16 (1991) (explaining why the UCC drafters decided not
to include consumer protection in Articles 3 and 4).
21 For example, as discussed infra Part III.A.2, Expedited Availability Act and Reg-
ulation CC provide that depositors should be given relatively prompt access to funds
from checks. Check 21's grant of the right to a recredit, however, came at the cost
of losing the right to the original check. Also, the ten-day recredit right only applies
up to $2500. The Consumers Union urged that the consumer recredit guarantee in
Check 21 be extended to all check transactions involving consumer accounts.
Facilitating Electronic Check Processing: Hearing on H.R. 1474 Before the Conlnl.
on House Fin. Serv. Subcomnnt. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit (Apr. 8, 2003)
(statement of Janell Mayo Duncan, Leg. and Reg. Counsel, Consumers Union).
22 The FRB has acknowledged consumers will be confused. See Check 21 Final
Rule, supra note 5, at 47,292.
23 A consumer has a right to the recredit only if a substitute check is provided
by the bank, the consumer never agreed to truncation, and the consumer satisfies the
requirements for submitting a claim. 12 U.S.C. § 5006.
24 The recredit applies only to consumers who are provided a substitute check. Id.
§ 5006(a)(I)(A). Consumers who have not agreed to truncation are entitled to receive
either the original checks or substitute checks along with their monthly statements.
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disputes that do not involve substitute checks are subject to the UCC.
The UCC contains no error resolution procedure, much less a recredit
right. The UCC only gives the consumer the option of suing the
financial institution for violating the UCC.25 Consumers will be
confused by the protections created by Check 21 and the UCC because
some consumers will have error resolution and recredit rights, while
others will not.
The consumer protection provisions of Check 21 illustrate Con-
gress's acknowledgment that payment systems must contain some
basic protections for consumers; even older payment systems, such
as checks, need revisiting now and then. However, Check 21 illustrates
how unsatisfactory it is to provide protection in piecemeal fashion.
Il. Many Sources of Consumer Confusion: The Murky
World of Payment Systems and Payment Products
A. Payment Systems
1. Electronic Fund Transfers
Check 21 is not the only source of consumer confusion. A consum-
er's checking account is like an airline company's hub city. Just as
many of the airliner's flights stop at the hub even though they have
another destination, many payment transfers pass through the consum-
er's checking account even though the funds may be going else-
where.26 Consumers may be confused because increasing numbers of
Check 21 Final Rule, supra note 5, at 47,322. Consumers who agreed to truncation
have a recredit right only if their bank voluntarily provides a substitute check. Id.
at 47,325.
25 See Edward L. Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and the Institutional Structure
of the Common Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 11 (1997) (arguing that numerous factors
deter consumers from obtaining remedies for violations of the UCC); Robert D. Cooter
& Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments, 66 TEX.
L. REV 63, 79-82 (1987) (comparing the costs of consumers and financial institutions
litigating a UCC dispute). See Cynthia Lee Starnes, Bad News Should Travel Fast:
Hot Checks, Tardy Banks, and the Uniform Commercial Code's Rude Surprise, 25
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 539 (1999) (stating that consumers are unlikely to
challenge a bank's failure to exercise charge-back in a timely fashion because of the
litigation costs and the small amount of consumer checks).
26 The hub analogy may be illustrated by typical payment transfers. The airline
hub has many arriving and departing flights. Once they arrive at the hub, they take
off for other destinations. Similarly, the consumer's checking account has arriving
payments (credits) such as direct deposit of payroll (an electronic transfer) and deposits
(cash and checks with the consumer as payee) the consumer makes at the teller or
20051
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these transactions do not involve the consumer writing checks, but
nevertheless appear on the consumer's monthly checking account
statement. These transactions appear on the statement because they
involve debits and credits to the consumer's checking account. Some
of the debits and credits which appear consist of electronic transfers
that are subject to the EFTA.27 Under the EFTA, all consumers have
the right to error resolution and a recredit. However, the EFTA
provides the consumer with sixty days to report an error to the bank, 28
whereas under Check 21 the consumer has only forty days to make
a claim. 29 Other items appearing on the monthly statement that do
not involve the consumer writing a check are paper instruments in
the form of preauthorized drafts sent by a creditor to the consumer's
bank (rather than electronic transfers). These often consist of "tele-
phone checks," and are subject to the UCC, which contains no error
resolution or recredit right. 30
In recent years, a method of processing payments called electronic
check conversion ("ECC") that involves both checks and electronic
fund transfers has become increasingly popular,31 but also a source
through an ATM. The consumer's account also has departing payments (debits) such
as checks written by the consumer, cash withdrawals at ATMs, preauthorized drafts
(telephone checks discussed infra Part llI.B.I), and electronic transfers such as
preauthorized transfers of recurring obligations such as mortgage payments and online
bill paying.
27 For the first time in U.S. history, in 2003. the number of electronic payments
surpassed the number of payments by check, 44.5 billion compared to 36.7 billion.
E-Payments Surpass Check Payments for the First Time, Federal Reserve Says, BNA
BANKING DAI.Y, Dec. 7, 2004.
28 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(a) (2000).
29 Id. § 5006(a)(2). The consumer must make a claim before the end of a forty-day
period beginning on the later of either the date the financial institution mails or delivers
a periodic statement, or the date on which a substitute check is made available to
the consumer. Several of those submitting comments to the FRB on its proposed Check
21 regulations suggested extending the Check 21 time period to sixty days to avoid
confusion and achieve uniformity with the EFTA. The FRB rejected that recommenda-
tion, opining that the forty-day period was mandated by the statute. Check 21 Final
Rule, supra note 5, at 46,302.
30 See discussion infra Part III.B.I.
31 Richard Mitchell, Merchant Acquiring: What's Next for Electronic Checks?,
CREDIT CARD MGMT., Nov. 1, 2004 (there were over 200 million electronic check
conversions in 2003, and NACHA predicts that there will be over I billion in 2004.
See generally www.checkconversioneducation.org (last visited March 26, 2005);
Steven Bills, Conversion Education Group Wrapping It Up, AM. BANKER, Feb. 27,
2004 (explaining why industry groups established check conversion education
website).
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of consumer confusion. ECC takes place in two situations: (1) when
a consumer hands the cashier a check to pay for goods3 2 and (2) when
the consumer mails a creditor a check to pay a bill. 33 In both cases,
the business does not process the check for collection. Rather, it uses
the check as a "source document," scanning information from the
MICR line in order to process the payment as an electronic fund
transfer.3 4 Because the payment is not processed as a check transac-
tion, the consumer does not receive the check with the monthly
statement. 35
Accordingly, when consumers tender a check in payment and do
not receive that original check in their bank statements, it may be due
to three reasons. First, they may have agreed to have their checks
truncated. These consumers should not be confused by the failure to
receive the original check. 36 Second, they may not receive the original
because, pursuant to Check 21, a substitute check was produced in
processing the check. Third, the merchant may have processed the
check by utilizing electronic check conversion. In the latter situation,
consumers probably do not understand that they have not received the
original check because it was processed by means of ECC.37
Although Regulation E ("Reg. E") requires notice of electronic
check conversion, it is unlikely consumers see or understand the ECC
32 Major merchants using this type of electronic check conversion include Home
Depot, Target and Wal-Mart. Loretta Kalb, Banks Must Take Advantage of Emerging
Technology To Survive, Say Experts, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 17, 2004.
33 This second situation is called "lockbox ECC." See David Brietkopf, Cards: Bank-
ers, Merchants Criticize Check Conversion Proposal, AM. BANKER, Nov. 29, 2004.
ECC has been characterized as "just an interim technology, designed to convert paper
payments into electronic ones. The endgame is to persuade consumers and corpora-
tions to issue electronic payments instead of writing checks." Will Wade, Outgoing
NACHA Chief Ponders Next Step for Payments Industry, AM. BANKER, Dec. 1, 2004
(reporting comments by the NACHA chairman).
3 4 MARK E. BUDN1TZ, CONSUMER BANKING AND PAYMENTS LAW 41 (2d ed. 2002
& Supp. 2004).
35 Where the consumer tenders a check to the cashier, the cashier may return the
check marked void. In that situation, the consumer should not be surprised when no
cancelled check is returned. In the second situation, where the check is mailed to
a "lockbox," the consumer may well be surprised.
36 However, that transaction may have resulted in a substitute check. Although the
consumer may not be confused by not receiving the original checks with the bank
statement, if there is an error on the statement, the consumer may not realize that
it may be due to the production of a substitute check.
37 Shannon Buggs, The Float Will Soon Be History, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 2,
2004.
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notice. 38 Through the media and brochures that banks have sent their
customers, many consumers have learned that there is a new law that
permits banks to stop returning original checks. These consumers, if
they have not agreed to truncation, may assume Check 21 applies to
all transactions in which they do not receive the original. Such
consumer confusion would be reduced to some extent if the law
required a degree of uniformity between notices regarding transactions
involving substitute checks and ECC.
The current disclosure system does little to alleviate consumer
confusion and, in many cases, does more harm than good. Under
certain circumstances, Check 21 requires financial institutions to
provide consumers with a consumer awareness notice.39 This require-
ment is critical to an effective protection regime; it does consumers
little good for Congress to enact laws for their protection unless
consumers are informed of those rights and how to take advantage
of them. At the same time, however, this notice must be considered
in the context of the numerous other notices consumers receive
regarding their checking accounts. In addition to Check 21 notices,
the customer may receive notices and disclosures about electronic fund
transfers such as direct deposit, electronic check conversion, debit card
and ATM transactions, and pre-authorized bill paying and online bill
paying. 40 The end result of these disclosures may be "notice over-
load." From a consumer protection standpoint, the best solution to this
problem is not to repeal laws requiring notices, but to change the
statutes to ensure greater uniformity. For example, if there were a
uniform rule for unauthorized use of the customer's account, consum-
ers could receive one notice that informs them of that rule, rather than
38 See Electronic Fund Transfers, 69 Fed. Reg. 55,996 (proposed Sept. 17, 2004)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 205) [hereinafter Reg. E Proposed Amendment] (stating
that the notices currently required "are not readily noticeable to consumers").
39 See 12 C.F.R. 229.57(a) (2005). "A bank must provide [the consumer awareness
disclosure] under two circumstances. First, each bank must provide the disclosure
to each of its consumer customers who receives paid checks with his or her account
statement. This requirement does not apply [if the consumer agreed to truncation]...
Second, a bank also must provide the disclosure when it (a) provides a substitute
check to a consumer in response to that consumer's request for a check or check
copy or (b) returns a substitute check to a consumer depositor." Check 21 Final Rule,
supra note 5, at 47,328.
40 15 U.S.C. § 1693c (2000). See generally Todd Davenport, Everyone at Fault
for Disclosure Mess: Williams, AM BANKER, Jan. 13, 2005, at 3 (according to Acting
Comptroller of the Currency Julie Williams, banks do not provide their customers
with the information they need to make informed decisions and "the process that
produces disclosure requirements virtually guarantees failure").
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several notices that inform consumers of several different rules,
depending upon what payment device is used.
The absence of uniform notice is only part of the problem. Consum-
ers also need uniform error resolution procedures to prevent undue
confusion from the many different types of consumer payments that
involve the consumer's checking account. Although both Check 21
and the EFTA require the financial institution to investigate and
recredit when the consumer alleges an error occurred, the consumer's
actual rights differ substantially depending on which statute applies.
If the consumer pays by check, but the error is not related to a
substitute check, the consumer has no right to an investigation and
recredit because Check 21's recredit procedure does not apply and
because there is no error resolution procedure under the UCC. Even
if the error is related to a substitute check, the consumer may not have
a right to a recredit and investigation if the consumer agreed to
truncation and the financial institution does not provide a substitute
check.41 Most consumers pay their credit cards by check, but have
very different rights when they refuse to pay because of a dispute
involving the card. 42
In order for consumers to be able to understand and properly invoke
an error resolution procedure, the law should require banks to investi-
gate errors and recredit the consumers' account regardless of whether
a check is processed as a check or an ECC, and regardless of whether
the consumer is provided a substitute check.
2. Check 21 and the Expedited Funds Availability Act
Check 21 represents the second major federal incursion into what
had been exclusively a state regulated commercial activity. The first
federal development was the Expedited Funds Availability Act (the
"EFAA")43 and Reg. CC." The EFAA applies both to commercial
and consumer checking accounts and requires the depositary bank to
make the customer's funds available promptly after a check is
deposited.4 5 Its enactment was a dramatic acknowledgment by the
41 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
42 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.21(b)-(c) (Reg. Z).
43 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (2000).
" 12 C.F.R. pt. 229. See generally Edward L. Rubin, Uniformity, Regulation, and
the Federalization of State Law: Lessons from the Payment System, 49 OHIO ST. L.J.
1251 (1989); Robert G. Ballen, The Federalization of Articles 3 and 4, 19 UCC L.J.
34 (1986).
45 12 U.S.C. §§ 4002
2005]
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legislature that the UCC could not be relied on to protect depositors. 46
The EFAA also demonstrates Congress' belief that federal intervention
into the traditionally state-regulated realm of checks was appropri-
ate. 47
Congress' motivation in enacting Check 21 was very different than
what prompted Congress to pass the EFAA. The EFAA resulted from
years of customer complaints that their banks unreasonably delayed
access to their funds after they deposited checks. 48 Check 21, in
contrast, is not the result of consumer demand. Rather, it furthers the
FRB's objective of moving towards an all-electronic system and the
banks' desire for legislation to facilitate check imaging. 49 While
granting consumers certain very narrowly circumscribed rights, its
main impact is to deprive customers of their ability to demand return
of their original checks.
Nevertheless, Check 21 may benefit consumers by prompting
changes to Reg. CC that would require banks to provide funds to
depositors more quickly than they do presently. The current availabil-
ity schedules are based on the time that banks need to process checks
under the paper presentment system. Check 21 is expected to result
in faster processing, which in turn would enable banks to make funds
available to customers sooner. Check 21 requires the FRB to examine
whether Reg. CC should be amended to require this result. 50 Legisla-
tion has been introduced in Congress to require depositary banks to
make funds available sooner than provided in Reg. CC.51
Despite the different factors that drove the enactment of the EFAA
and Check 21, both laws represent significant federal law incursions
into an area that had previously been under state regulation. Given
the establishment of new payment products, policymakers should
46 See Rubin, supra note 44, at 1261 (stating that Reg. CC preempts the UCC and
was the beginning of the federalization of check processing law).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1257 (the EFAA resulted from consumer complaints about banks' policies
of placing lengthy holds on consumer funds).
49 See Check 21 Final Rule, supra note 5, at 47,290.
50 12 U.S.C. § 5015.
51 Linda Micco, Legislation Would Require Faster Clearance of Checks Deposited
by Consumers, BNA BANKING DAILY, Dec. 2, 2004 (anticipating faster check
processing as a result of Check 21, H.R. 5410 would reduce the time banks can put
a hold on deposited funds). See also Government Press Release, Federal Document
Clearing House, Committee Monitors Check 21 To Ensure Quick Turnaround for All
Checks, Dec. 7, 2004.
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confront the issue of whether additional aspects of consumer payments
law involving checks should be federal law rather than governed by
the UCC.
B. Payment Products
However, the problem is more complex than merely whether check
law should be federal or state law. The previous discussion of ECC
illustrates that the same transaction may involve more than one type
of payment product. ECC, for example, involves both a check and
an electronic fund transfer. Nonetheless, only federal law, Reg. E,
applies to the ECC transaction.5 2 This subpart provides a brief
overview of the various payment products available to consumers
today and the non-uniform laws governing their transfers.
1. Telephone Checks
Consumers often deal with telemarketers, debt collectors, and others
in ways that result in preauthorized drafts, often called "telephone
checks." For example, when consumers order goods over the phone,
sellers frequently request their checking account information. The
sellers may use that data to prepare a draft to present to the consumer's
bank, resulting in the withdrawal of funds from the consumer's
account. That draft is referred to as a telephone check. 5 3 Many
consumers have alleged that phone transactions result in unauthorized
withdrawals.54 Consumers complain that sellers and debt collectors
obtain withdrawals when consumers have never authorized any, obtain
multiple withdrawals when they authorized only one, or obtain more
than the authorized amount. 55
To respond to this problem, the UCC was amended in 2002 to create
a new type of negotiable instrument, the "remotely-created consumer
item," and to change the warranty rules to encourage the consumer's
bank (the payor bank) to recredit the consumer's account when the
52 Notably, in both ECC and transactions involving substitute checks, consumers
whose deposit agreements provide they will receive their original checks nevertheless
do not receive them. Despite this similarity, the applicable federal laws regulating
these transactions differ in significant respects.
53 MANN, supra note 4, at 64.
54 Caroline Mayer, Checking Account Fraud Is Increasing, WASHINGTON POST,
July 19, 2004, at Al.
55 MANN, supra note 4, at 79.
20051
260 ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW [Vol. 24: 247
consumer complains that an unauthorized withdrawal was made
pursuant to a telephone check. 56
As a general rule, if the consumer's bank pays a check that the
consumer did not authorize, the loss is on the bank unless it can recover
from the wrongdoer.5 7 Amended UCC Articles 3 and 4, however,
include special warranty rules for telephone checks that enable the
consumer's bank to push liability back to the depositary bank.5 8
Although the consumer's bank is not required to take advantage of
the new warranty rules, the expectation is that the consumer's bank
will be more willing to recredit the consumer's account if it can avoid
liability by passing it on to another bank.
However, in practice, the consumer's bank may not often meet this
expectation. The consumer's bank may prefer not to enter into a
dispute with the depositary bank. Instead, the bank may refuse to
recredit the consumer's account, assuming that the burden and expense
of litigation will deter consumers from bringing suit. The banks may
assume that the affected consumers likely will terminate their accounts
with that bank. The prospect of losing a few low profit consumer
accounts, however, may not be enough to motivate banks to exercise
their new warranty rights against depositary banks.
As of April 2004, only one state, Minnesota, had adopted any of
the 2002 amendments to UCC Articles 3 and 4 issued by the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. However, instead of enacting the uniform
provision on telephone checks, it adopted a non-uniform amend-
ment. 59 Minnesota's non-uniform amendment tracks the language of
several other states' "demand draft" statutes. 60 These jurisdictions
have passed statutes that are similar to the UCC's provisions on
56 U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(16) (2002). The "remotely-created consumer item" is an item
"not created by a payor bank and does not bear a handwritten signature purporting
to be the signature of the drawer [the consumer]." An "item" is an instrument handled
by a bank for collection or payment. Id. § 4-104(a)(9).
57 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 552-53
(4th ed. 1995).
58 U.C.C. §§ 3-416(a)(6), 3-417(a)(4), 4-207(a)(6), 4-208(a)(4).
59 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 336.3-103(a)(16), 336.3-416(a)(6), 336-417(a)(4), 336.4-
207(a)(6), 336.4-208(a)(4) (2002).
60 E.g., CAL. COM. CODE §§ 3104(k), 3416(a)(6), 3417(a)(4), 4207(a)(6), 4208(a)(4)
(2002). States with demand draft statutes in addition to California include Colorado,
Hawaii, Idaho, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, and West Virginia.
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remotely-created consumer items, except they apply both to consumer
and non-consumer drafts that do not contain the drawer's signature.61
These statutes also include a "reciprocity provision" under which the
favorable warranty rules that permit the payor bank to pass liability
to another bank apply only if the state where the other bank is located
has reciprocated by also adopting the special warranty rules. 62
Meanwhile, the FRB solicited comments on the merits of incorporat-
ing the UCC's rules on remotely created items into Reg. CC.63 As
discussed above, if the UCC's rules are incorporated, depositary banks
in all states would be subject to the rules permitting payor banks to
shift the loss to those depository banks in consumer transactions. Only
in demand draft states, however, would depositary banks be subjected
to those rules in non-consumer transactions.
Banks favor the demand draft approach because under that system
they do not have to distinguish between consumer and non-consumer
checks, a task which they claim is operationally difficult. 64 In contrast,
amended Articles 3 and 4 apply only to consumer telephone checks,
forcing banks to determine which checks fall into the consumer
category. The American Bankers Association has opposed the adoption
of amended Articles 3 and 4 because of the alleged operational
difficulties the telephone check provision requires. 65 The ABA's
objection illustrates a potential impediment to uniform rules. Opera-
tional problems may arise that make implementation difficult and
61 E.g., id. § 3104(k) (2002) (defining "demand draft" as a writing under the pur-
ported authority of a "customer," thereby not distinguishing between commercial and
consumer customers as the uniform version does.)
62 E.g., id. § 4208(h) (West 2004).
63 Check 21 Final Rule, supra note 5, at 47,306. The FRB subsequently issued
a proposed rule regarding incorporation of the UCC's rules. Collection of Checks
and Other Items by Federal Reserve Banks and Funds Transfers Through Fedwire
and Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks, 70 Fed. Reg. 10,509 (proposed
March 4, 2005) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 210 and 229).
64 See, e.g., Letter from Rebecca S. Henderson, Senior Vice President and Deputy
General Counsel, Wachovia Corporation, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (May 3, 2005), available at
www.federareserve.gov/SECRSI2005/May/20050505/R- 1226/R- 1226_235_l.pdf.
65 Memorandum from L.H. Wilson, General Counsel, American Bankers Associa-
tion, to State Association Executives and Counsel and Interested Persons (Sept. 27,
2002) (on file with author). It is unclear how much of a burden the telephone check
amendment would impose. Under Check 21 banks will have to differentiate between
consumer and non-consumer accounts because consumers are accorded special
protections under that Act. See supra Part II.
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expensive. On the other hand, one should not assume that there will
be significant operational problems. For example, despite the ABA's
objections, banks may not encounter undue difficulties differentiating
between consumer and non-consumer accounts in most transactions,
since banks already have to distinguish the two types of accounts for
many purposes. 66
Further complicating matters, certain persons who do business with
consumers over the phone are subject to the Telemarketing Sales Rule,
a federal regulation issued by the Federal Trade Commission (the
"FTC").67 Consequently, payment to telemarketers with telephone
checks is potentially subject to both the UCC and the FTC's rule. The
Telemarketing Sales Rule requires telemarketers to follow strict
requirements for obtaining the consumer's "verifiable authorization"
in telemarketing transactions. 6 8 If the consumer pays by means of an
electronic fund transfer other than a debit card, the FTC authorization
requirements apply; accordingly, the authorization requirements apply
with respect to consumers who pay with telephone checks, but not
to those who pay with credit or debit cards.69
In addition to federal and state law governing payments, most
electronic transfers are subject to private rulemaking. Telephone sales
in which payments are removed from the consumer's account electron-
ically are governed not only by Reg. E, but also by the rules established
by NACHA (the "NACHA Rules"). 70 Parties that process electronic
66 For example, under Reg. E, consumers with electronic fund transfers that debit
and credit checking accounts receive notices and have rights that business accounts
do not have. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.4 (2005) (disclosure requirements); id. § 205.11
(error resolution).
67 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580 (Jan. 29, 2003); 16 C.F.R.
§ 310.3(a)(3) (2005)
68 Id. See also, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 2464 (2004) (state law governing
the authorization of payment instruments in telemarketing transactions), noted in UCC
§ 3-416, Official Cmt. 8 (2002). See generally Payment Processor Barred From
Helping Telemarketers, BNA Banking Rep., April 19, 2004, at 703 (FTC filed
proposed consent judgment against company that processed electronic debit to
consumer accounts on behalf of fraudulent telemarketers, in violation of the
Telemarketing Sales Rule).
69 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2005).
Reg. Z and Reg. E do not include rules comparable to the FTC's Telemarketing
Sales Rule. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5-226.16 (governing credit cards) 12 C.F.R. pt.
205 (governing debit cards).
70 See NACHA RULES 2.1.5 (obtaining the consumer's authorization); NACHA
RULES 3.9.1 (employing commercially reasonable procedures to verify the consumer's
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payments through the Automated Clearing House ("ACH") Network
are required as a condition of using the network to comply with
NACHA's Rules, 71 which govern various matters such as direct
deposit, electronic check conversion, bill payment, ATM transfers,
debit card transactions, online payments, and debits authorized over
the phone. Some of the rules are very favorable to consumers, going
beyond anything required by Reg. E.72 In addition, NACHA can act
faster than legislatures and federal agencies to respond to changing
products and market conditions. 73
identity); MARK E. BUDNITZ & MARGOT FREEMAN SAUNDERS, CONSUMER BANKING
AND PAYMENTS LAW 53-54 (2d ed. Supp. 2004). NACHA is a not-for-profit member-
ship organization. The membership consists of approximately forty regional associa-
tions. These associations represent more than 13,000 financial institutions. Those
financial institutions provide automated clearinghouse services to over 20,000
financial institutions, 3.5 million businesses, and 115 million individuals. The NACHA
Homepage, at www.nacha.org/About/default.htm.
71 UNDERSTANDING THE ACH NETWORK: AN ACH PRIMER, 2004 ACH RULES,
A COMPLETE GUIDE TO RULES & REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ACH NETWORK,
ACH PRIMER 12 (2004). The NACHA Rules apply to ACH transfers through ACH
operators. The rules do not apply to a direct send whereby one bank makes an
electronic transfer directly to another bank without using a clearinghouse. In addition,
the Rules do not apply to an "on-us" electronic transfer in which both the business
and the consumer are customers of the same bank and the bank makes an intra-bank
transfer. NACHA also has issued operating guidelines, which supplement, but do not
supercede, the NACHA Rules. BENJAMIN GEVA, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS
TRANSFERS 5-4 (LexisNexis 2002).
72 NACHA's rules for electronic check conversion provide greater protection for
consumers than Reg. E provides. For example, under the NACHA Rules consumers
have the opportunity to opt out of lockbox ECC. Disclosure, F.N.B. Corporation,
Notice of Amendment to the 2004 ACH Rules (Apr. 6, 2004), at
www.fnbcorporation.com/generalDisclosures/2004_ACHRulesSupplement_ 2
Summary.pdf. The biller is prohibited from returning the check; it must destroy the
check within fourteen days. NACHA RULES, 2.9.3.3. This procedure prevents the
original check from being put into the processing system, resulting in a double debit
from the consumer's account. The consumer can stop payment on a lockbox ECC.
NACHA RULES, 7.4. The consumer has a right to a recredit under certain circum-
stances. NACHA RULES, 7.6.5.1.
7 3 See e.g., NACHA's 2004 rule permitting consumers to opt out of lockbox ECC.
Disclosure, F.N.B. Corporation, Notice of Amendment to the 2004 ACH Rules
(Apr. 6, 2004), at www.fnbcorporation.com/generalDisclosures/
2004_ACHRulesSupplement_2_Summary.pdf. The NACHA Rules are developed
by a Rules Work Group which, after consultation with others, submits a proposal
to the Rules and Operations Committee of NACHA. If the committee approves the
proposal, they submit it to the NACHA Board for adoption. PAUL S. TURNER, LAW
OF PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND EFT 11-6 (2002).
2005]
264 ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW [Vol. 24: 247
NACHA Rules are deficient in several respects, however. For
example, almost none of the NACHA Rules require disclosure to
consumers. Consequently, few consumers are aware of their enhanced
rights. Even if consumers know a company has not complied with
the NACHA Rules, the rules do not explicitly grant consumers a direct
cause of action; nothing in the rules provides that if another party to
a transaction violates the rules, the consumer can use that as the basis
of a lawsuit against that party. 74 In addition, some NACHA Rules,
while granting more protection to consumers than statutes and regula-
tions, add to the complexity of the piecemeal approach that legislatures
have taken with respect to certain payment products. For example,
as discussed above, a morass of federal and state regulations currently
governs telephone transactions.
A more fundamental problem stems from the fact that the NACHA
Rules are the product of private rulemaking. There are three problems
inherent in the process of drafting and issuing such private rules from
the consumer perspective. First, consumers have no role in drafting
the rules. Second, while NACHA has a rulemaking process that can
respond quickly to adjust rules to changing payment products and
systems, it also can revoke rules at any time and for any reason, again
without any consumer participation in the process, much less notice
to them.
Third, and most problematic, NACHA is subject to no government
oversight, much less supervision. In contrast, the UCC is subject to
government oversight. The UCC is also drafted by private entities,
namely the American Law Institute ("ALI") and the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL").75
However, NCCUSL has a quasi-governmental appearance in that its
Commissioners are appointed by each state's governor. More impor-
tantly, amendments to the UCC must be enacted by each state's
74 See FTC v. Electronic Financial Group, Inc., No. W-03-CA-211 (W.D. Tex. July
8, 2003). The FTC obtained a temporary restraining order against a company accused
of engaging in unfair practices in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (the "FTC Act") by systematically breaching its agreement with its
bank to comply with NACHA rules. Although there is no private cause of action under
the FTC Act, consumers arguably could draw support from this case to contend that
violating the NACHA rules is an unfair practice under state unfair and deceptive
practice laws that do include a private cause of action. See BUDNITZ & FREEMAN
SAUNDERS, supra note 70, at 62-63.
7 5 FRANCIS J. MOOTZ Ill ET AL., COMMERCIAL CONTRACTING: SALES, LEASES, AND
COMIUTER INFORMATION 1 (2004) (ALl and NCCUSL are the sponsors and drafters
of the UCC).
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legislature. An amendment to the UCC approved by ALI and NCCUSL
therefore is nothing more than a proposal to those legislatures.
Furthermore, legislatures often disagree with the proposals and adopt
their own non-uniform amendments, including those guaranteeing
consumer rights where the ALI-NCCUSL approved amendment pro-
vided none. 76 No analogous procedures check NACHA's rulemaking
authority. It is arguably troublesome that a private entity should be
allowed to wield such unimpeded influence over crucial economic
issues.
Delegation of payment processing rules to private bodies is not
unprecedented, of course. The UCC explicitly recognizes and incorpo-
rates the rules of check clearinghouses, as long as their rules do not
conflict with the UCC. 77 Check clearinghouse rules, however, only
regulate check processing among banks. In contrast, the NACHA
Rules have a direct impact on consumer rights when something goes
wrong. The NACHA Rules play an important role in ensuring that
consumers have vital protections when erroneous electronic transfers
occur. Because millions of Americans live paycheck to paycheck, the
consequences can be devastating when there is a problem such as a
multiple debit. A multiple debit can drain assets out of an account
resulting in missed car payments that lead to repossession or missed
rent that leads to eviction. This is a matter that is particularly
appropriate for public law; it should not be left exclusively to private
rulemaking. 78
2. Stored Value Cards: New Products, Little Law
Over the last few years, financial institutions have developed several
new payment products, such as gift cards, phone cards, and payroll
cards. 79 Each product and service has its own consumer benefits and
risks. Moreover, consumers' legal rights and responsibilities vary
dramatically depending upon which payment product they use.
Stored value cards, also called prepaid cards, are payment products
in which the consumer pays first and purchases goods or services later,
76 For example, several states have adopted non-uniform amendments to U.C.C.
§ 4-406 (2002). See generally BUDNITZ & FREEMAN SAUNDERS, supra note 70.
77 U.C.C. § 4-103(b).
78 See David G. Oedel, Private Interbank Discipline 16 HARV. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y
327, 402-407 (1993) (acknowledging that consumers need government regulation to
protect their interests in spite of the benefits of non-public bank regulation).
7 9 See BUDNITZ & FREEMAN SAUNDERS, supra note 70, at 99-107.
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using value stored on the card that can be accessed through a computer
terminal. Some are re-loadable, meaning that when the funds available
on the card are spent, more can be "loaded" onto the card. 80 The most
popular examples of stored value cards are pre-paid phone cards and
gift cards. 81 These cards can be beneficial to consumers for multiple
reasons. Since the cards are pre-paid, consumers who do not qualify
for credit cards can still obtain stored value cards. In addition, unlike
with debit cards, consumers do not need to have bank accounts.
However, the cards often come with hidden costs and other prob-
lems. 82 For example, some cards deduct value not only for the amount
of the purchase, but also for a wide variety of additional charges.8 3
80 Some cards can contain substantial value. For example, the "Usher Card" can
carry up to $2500 in value. MasterCard, Cardholder Agreement, available at
www.ushermc.com/terms.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2004).
81 A National Retail Federation survey found that sales of gift cards for the 2004
holiday season were projected to be $17.34 billion, a $100 million increase from the
previous year. Anne Mitchell, Gift Card Sales Roar, NEWS-PRESS (FT. MYERS, FL),
Dec. 14, 2004, at ID. Cards are used for other purposes as well. There are cards
for Filipino sailors and Hispanics who use the cards to send money overseas, and
cards to disburse financial aid to college students. Paper or Plastic: New Card Options
Promise To Further Displace Checks, ITEM PROCESSING REP., July 29, 2004. Prepaid
phone cards can be used to pay for online adventure game subscriptions. Lavonne
Kuykendall, Payment Firms Offering Prepaid Game Card, AM. BANKER, Nov. 7,
2004, at 5.
82 See A Commercial Lawyer's Take on the Electronic Purse: An Analysis of Com-
mercial Law Issues Associated with Stored-Value cards and Electronic Money, 52
Bus. LAW. 653 (1997); Mark E. Budnitz, Stored Value Cards and the Consumer:
The Need for Regulation, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1028,1034-35 (1997); BUDNITZ
& FREEMAN SAUNDERS, supra note 70, at 172-75. In December 2004, the Consumers
Union launched a campaign urging Congress to pass "The Fair Gift Act," to protect
consumers from excessive fees. ConsumersUnion.org, Consumers Union Calls on
Congress To Rein in Gift Cards Fees (Dec. 14, 2004), available at,
www.consumersunion.org/pub/core-financialservices/001711 .html. The N.Y. Attor-
ney General persuaded seventeen national retailers to change their policies on lost
or stolen gift cards because consumers believed the protections that apply to debit
or credit cards also applied to gift cards. Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer, National Retailers Agree To Improve Gift Card Policies (Feb.
25, 2003). The Attorneys General of New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Vermont sued Simon Property Group, alleging their gift cards violated state law. Simon
Says Settlement Is OK, CARDLINE, March 4, 2005 (reporting that Simon and the N.Y.
Attorney General had reached an out-of-court settlement).
83 The Usher card includes the following fees, among others: $15 activation fee;
$3.95 fee to load value onto card; cash withdrawal fee of $2.00; balance inquiry fee
of $1.50; monthly maintenance fee of $4.95; $9.95 replacement card fee; $5 charge
for a paper statement; $5 overdraft fee, $1.50 per minute to talk to a live service
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Dormancy charges are often imposed if the card is not used for a
certain period of time. 84 Many cards also contain expiration dates after
which the cards cannot be used. 85 Some cards do not permit consumers
to redeem any unused value, while others impose a fee on any
allowable redemption. 86 Consumers may not even be able to ascertain
how much value remains on a card. If a card is lost or stolen, the
consumer bears the full loss of any value on the card. Sometimes, even
if a card is defective, consumers may not be able to obtain a new card
from the issuer. In fact, consumers may have no way to find the
issuer's address or phone number, and thus have no way to even
contact the issuer. Finally, the company that issued the card may go
agent; $9.95 fee to redeem unused funds. Usher Debit Mastercard, Cardholder
Agreement (Dec. 4, 2004), available at www.ushermc.com/terms.html. The Hello
Kitty card has comparable fees along with additional fees not found on the Usher
card, including a $14.95 application fee, and an annual fee of $14.95 after the first
year, a card cancellation fee of $10, and a charge of $5 to withdraw funds from the
card using a bank teller. Hello Kitty Debit Mastercard, Cardhoider Agreement (Dec.
4, 2004), available at www.hellokittycard.com/cardholder-agree.doc. See Carolyn
Said, Hip-hop Tycoon Jumps into Banking / Prepaid Debit Card for Those Without
Bank Accounts, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 19, 2004, at J 1 (quoting publisher
of payment system newsletter claiming that "[t]hese are excessive fees that unfortu-
nately poor people get socked with by marketing companies" and describing the fees
charged for using the Rushcard, sponsored by Russell Simmons).
84 Phil Kabler, Why Us? English Only Bill Target of Media Barbs, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, April 18, 2005 (reporting that many gift cards have dormancy fees).
85 Id. (reporting that many gift cards have expiration dates).
86 One study of gift cards found that 6% of the money on the cards was never
used. Deena M. Amato-McCoy, Will Gift Card Fees Kill Customer Loyalty? Gift
Cards Help Build Store Loyalty, but Hidden Fees Can Anger Consumers and End
Up Hurting a Retailer's Image, GROCERY HEADQUARTERS, Aug. 1, 2004. This
represents a source of income for stores. Id. Some states, however, require retailers
to turn unused funds over to the state under Abandoned Property laws, while other
states exempt gift cards from that requirement. Carolyn Shapiro, Retailers Hope
Customers Will Spend More Than Amount of Gifts, VIRGINIA-PILOT, Dec. 31, 2004.
Even if gift cards are subject to the Abandoned Property laws, merchants can reduce
the balance on the card to zero if they impose dormancy and other fees. Deborah
Turcotte, Treasurer Wants To Make Fees on Gift Cards Illegal, BANGOR DAILY NEWS,
Dec. 14, 2004. Because some states limit fees, merchants have tried to avoid state
Abandoned Property laws by having federally chartered banks administer their card
programs, claiming that national bank involvement exempts the gift cards from state
law. National Issuing Overcomes U.S. Regulatory Burden, CARDS INTERNATIONAL,
Dec. 20, 2004. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency disputes this, saying
the National Bank Act does not preempt state law on this issue. Branded Gifi Cards
Are in Crosshairs of State Regulators, ATM & DEnrr NEWS, Feb. 24, 2005.
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out of business, leaving the consumer with no source to remedy any
problems.8 7
No federal laws govern stored value cards. 88 Most states also have
no laws in place. A few states have passed laws to regulate certain
aspects of specific types of cards, primarily gift cards.89 Absent an
applicable state law, the parties' rights and responsibilities arise solely
from the contract between the consumer and the issuer. If a problem
arises, the consumer's sole course of action is a lawsuit for breach
of contract. However, a skillfully drafted contract in which the issuer
disclaims responsibility for problems will foreclose this avenue of
relief for the consumer.
Consumers likely do not realize that they have minimal, if any, legal
protections when using stored value cards. One source of confusion
is the fact that these cards are made to look like debit and credit cards.
In fact, Visa and MasterCard issue stored value cards imprinted with
their logos. 90 Because stored value cards bear a striking resemblance
87 Budnitz, Stored Value Cards, supra note 82, at 1028 (stating that several issuers
of stored value cards have gone out of business after selling thousands of worthless
cards). The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the "OCC") has warned
consumers that when they buy a gift card they are putting their trust in the company's
financial stability. Gift Cards: OCC Provides Holiday Tips for Consumers, available
at www.treas.gov/ftp/release/2004-108a.pdf. Gift cards also are used to perpetrate
fraud. See., e.g. News Release, FTC Accepts Settlement with Final Defendant in "Pre-
Approved" Credit Card Scam (Aug. 16, 2004), available at www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/08/
firstcapital.htm . (settling case brought by FTC alleging that company promised
consumers pre-approved credit cards, but instead sent them stored value cards
requiring prepayment before use).
88 The FRB proposes to regulate one type of stored value card, the payroll card.
See Reg. E Proposed Amendment, supra note 38. The FDIC proposes that FDIC
insurance cover certain types of stored value cards. Definition of "Deposit;" Stored
Value Cards, 69 Fed. Reg. 20,558, 20,563 (Apr. 16, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 303) [hereinafter FDIC Proposed Rule].
89 E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1749.5 (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 200A, § 5D
(2005); S.B. 6611 227th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2004); S.B. 6612 227th Ann. Leg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13-12 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.240.040 (2005). Several of these statutes include a major exemption, excluding
from coverage third-party card issuers that issue devices usable at multiple, unaffiliated
merchants. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13-12(a) (2005); CAL. Clv. CODE § 1749.45(a)
(2005). California also regulates prepaid telephone cards. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 17538.9 (2005).
90 The significance of merchants teaming with Visa and MasterCard to issue gift
cards has become an issue in litigation brought against the Simon mal card by several
state attorneys general and illustrates the confusion surrounding these cards. Simon
contends that Bank of America issues its card with a Visa logo and that, as a national
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to credit and debit cards, 91 consumers may believe there is some type
of legislatively mandated error resolution procedure and limit on
liability for unauthorized use. 9 2 Consumer confusion will only in-
crease as companies issue cards that combine credit, debit, and stored
value on one card.
Another type of stored value card, the payroll card, has become
increasingly popular with employers - particularly those with many
workers without bank accounts into which wages can be transferred
electronically by direct deposit. Transferring funds through payroll
cards is much cheaper than issuing payroll checks. 93 Typically, the
bank, both Bank of America and its cards are subject only to federal law and Visa
rules. The OCC and the state attorneys general contend that Simon issues the card,
not the bank. Hannah Bergman, Gift Card Case Has OCC Siding with States, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 17, 2004.
91 The Duetto card combines the functionality of a credit card and a stored value
card. The consumer can use the card as a general purpose Visa credit card or as a
stored value card to purchase coffee at Starbucks; purchases with the card also earn
cash rewards that can be redeemed at Starbucks. Hilary Cassidy, A Latte with That
Purchase? New Programs Entice Users, BRANDWEEK, June 21, 2004.
92 Visa and MasterCard have "zero liability" policies that apply to their gift cards,
but they differ from the limited liability provisions of Reg. Z and Reg. E. Visa's
website states in some places that its zero liability policy applies to "unauthorized"
transactions, and in other places that it applies to "fraudulent" transactions. See VISA,
Zero Liability, at www.visa.com/personal/security/zero_liability.html (last visited
Dec. 11, 2004). Because the terms are not synonymous, it is difficult to ascertain
what the legal standard might be. ATM transactions are excluded. Id. Furthermore,
financial institutions that issue the cards may impose greater liability if they determine
an unauthorized transaction was caused by "gross negligence or fraudulent action of
the cardholder, which may include. . . delay for an unreasonable time in reporting
unauthorized transactions." Id. MasterCard's website states that cardholders need to
pay only for purchases that they "authorize." Mastercard, Zero Liability, at
www.mastercard.com/general/ zerojliability.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2005). However,
to be eligible for Mastercard's zero liability policy the consumer's account must be
in good standing, the consumer must have exercised reasonable care in safeguarding
the card, and the consumer must not have reported two or more unauthorized transfers
in the past year. Id. The Usher Card bears a MasterCard logo, but states a policy
that differs from that stated on the MasterCard website. Usher, Cardholder Agreement,
at www.ushermc.com/terms.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2005). For example, the zero
liability policy only applies if the cardholder notifies the card issuer within two days.
Id. If the consumer notifies the issuer later, and the issuer can prove it could have
stopped the card from being used if the consumer had notified it within the two days,
the consumer could be liable for as much as $50. Id.
93 Mark Furletti, Conference Summary, Prepaid Cards: How Do They Function?
How Are They Regulated?, Payment Cards Center, Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia 10 (June 2-3, 2004).
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employer sets up a bank account and issues cards to employees, who
then can go to an ATM or store with a point-of-sale terminal to
withdraw their wages. 94 A payroll card has advantages over payroll
checks for employees who do not have a bank account. 95 If issued
a payroll check, such employees often go to check cashers who charge
exorbitant fees. 96 Check cashers may induce employees to purchase
additional expensive goods and services such as payday loans and rent-
to-own furniture and appliances. 97 In addition, after going to a check
casher, employees paid with checks will be walking around with a
substantial amount of cash, risking loss or theft.
Payroll cards, however, also have disadvantages. Employees may
be charged a fee every time they use an ATM. 98 Although the fee
for each withdrawal may be lower than the fee charged by a check
casher, if employees want to avoid carrying their entire wages with
them in cash, and instead use an ATM to withdraw smaller amounts
as needed, the total ATM fees for the successive withdrawals may
be as much as the check casher's one-time fee. Additionally, employ-
ees may only be able to withdraw wages from ATMs in certain
multiples, such as $20. As a result, they may not be able to withdraw
the full amount of their wages for a given pay period. This may impose
a hardship on minimum wage employees who need access to every
dollar of their pay during each pay period. ATMs that employees can
use to withdraw funds may not be located close to where the employee
lives or works. 99
The FDIC has proposed that FDIC insurance would cover those
wages on cards where the employer has a separate account or sub-
account for employees. 100 In addition, the FRB has proposed a rule
that would extend the protections of Reg. E to payroll cards. 101 Even
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 See id.
97 See James P. Nehf, Effective Regulation of Rent-to-Own Contracts, 52 OHIO ST.
L.J. 751 (1991); MICHAEL HUDSON, 'Rent-to-Own,' The Slick Cousin of Paying on
Time, in MERCHANTS OF MISERY: How CORPORATE AMERICA PROFITS FROM
POVERTY 146 (Michael Hudson ed., 1996).
98 Furletti, supra note 93, at 11.
99 David Gosnell, Debit Card Report, CREDIT CARD MANAGEMENT, Sept. 1, 2004
(reporting that even if employer contracts with an ATM service operating thousands
of ATMs, the payroll cardholder may not find one close by).
100 FDIC Proposed Rule, supra note 88, at 20,558, 20,560, 20,562-563.
101 Reg. E Proposed Amendment, supra note 38, at 55,996, 55,999. The Office
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if these rules become final, however, there will still be a need for a
comprehensive uniform law, because these proposals only apply to
limited types of stored value cards and issuers, and most states have
no laws that fill in the gaps.
C. Consumer Confusion: Deciphering the Legal Landscape
For consumers of payment products, the current legal landscape is
incomprehensible. Different payment products are subject to very
different laws, or no law at all besides contract law. Consequently,
consumers' rights and responsibilities vary greatly. As discussed
below, the disparity in rights to disclosures, notices of rights, liability
for unauthorized use, and error resolution demonstrates the need for
uniformity.
1. Disclosures and Notices of Rights
The UCC is the principal law that applies to the bank-consumer
aspects of check transactions. 10 2 The Truth in Savings Act and
Regulation DD also apply to check transactions and require disclosure
to customers of information such as fees and conditions. 103 Neverthe-
less, these laws are of limited benefit to consumers. Neither law
requires, for example. that consumers receive notice regarding their
rights and responsibilities under the UCC. Moreover, Congress re-
pealed the section of the Truth in Savings Act which had provided
customers with a private right of action. 104 Therefore, consumers still
of the Comptroller of the Currency has issued an Advisory Letter that lists its concern
that national banks engaged in payroll card systems may "directly or indirectly support
unfair or deceptive practices." Payroll Card Systems, OCC Advisory Letter 2004-6
(May 6, 2004), available at 2004 OCC CB LEXIS 36, at *5. It is unsettled whether
several of the matters listed in the Advisory Letter would be dealt with if the FRB's
proposed rule to subject payroll cards to Reg. E becomes final. See Reg. E Proposed
Amendment, supra note 38, at 55,999. Examples include disclosing "risk exposures
including absence of deposit insurance and potential bankruptcy of any third parties
holding funds, where and how the payroll cards will be accepted and the funds
accessed including whether workers can access their funds without charge at ATMs.
See Payroll Card Systems, OCC Advisory Letter 2004-6 (May 6, 2004), available
at 2004 OCC CB LEXIS 36.
102 The other major laws are Reg. CC and Check 21. See discussion supra Part
II.
103 See 12 U.S.C. § 4301 (2000) (Truth in Savings Act); 12 C.F.R. § 230.1 (2005)
(Regulation DD). See generally Barnes v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, N.A., 370 F.3d 164 (1st
Cir. 2004) (holding that the bank's notice regarding changes in the customer's account
was false and misleading, in violation of the Truth in Savings Act).
104 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 2604(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009 (1996) (repealing 12 U.S.C. § 4310).
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have rights under the statute, but no remedy for a violation. They must
depend on enforcement by federal agencies. 105
Check 21 requires disclosure of important information to consumers,
but only to a limited number of check customers. Consumers who have
not agreed to have their checks truncated have a right to a disclosure
that describes "substitute checks" and their right to a recredit if they
file a complaint and the bank cannot resolve it within ten days.106
Unfortunately, the 60% of consumers who have agreed to have their
checks truncated have no right to this crucial information unless their
bank voluntarily or inadvertently provides them with a "substitute
check." 10 7 In contrast, if the consumer pays with a credit card,
Regulation Z ("Reg. Z") requires extensive and continuous disclo-
sures. 108 Likewise, Reg. E requires banks to provide comprehensive
disclosures to consumers who agree to electronic transfers, including
those who use debit cards. 10 9
A recently proposed interagency guidance on overdraft protection
programs goes even further than any current regulations. 110 According
to the "best practices""' named in the proposal, financial institutions
should not only "fairly represent" these programs, but also "inform
consumers generally of other available overdraft services."" 2 More-
over, the guidance recommends that financial institutions explain the
"costs and advantages of various alternatives . . . and identify for
consumers the risks and problems." 113 These suggested disclosures
would "minimize potential consumer confusion and complaints, foster
good customer relations, and reduce credit and other potential risks
105 12 U.S.C. § 4309.
lo6 Id. § 5011.
107 Check 21 requires the bank to provide the disclosure only to consumers who
have been "provided" a substitute check, Id. § 5011 (b), and only those customers
who have not agreed to truncation have a right to be provided a substitute check.
Check 21 Final Rule, supra note 5, at 47,322.
108 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.6-226.9.
109 Id. §§ 204.7-205.9. The NACHA rules include consumer protections that go
further than Reg. E, but for the most part do not require disclosure of those rights
to consumers. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
110 Interagency Guidance on Overdraft Protection Programs, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,858
(June 7, 2004).
111 id. at 31,863 (characterizing "best practices" as "practices that have been imple-
mented by institutions and that may otherwise be required by applicable law").
112 Id. (emphasis added).
113 Id.
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to the institution."114 If this approach were applied to consumer
payment products, financial institutions would be required to educate
their customers in a manner beyond anything now required.
The benefits would not accrue only to consumers of financial
institutions, however. The best practices that the federal regulatory
agencies point out in regard to overdraft programs should also apply
to other payment systems. Indeed, there is a direct link between the
proposed guidance on overdraft programs and payment products and
systems. Consumers who are not well informed about how payment
products and systems operate are less likely to understand the impor-
tance of careful recordkeeping and ensuring there are adequate funds
in their accounts. Consequently, these customers are more apt to have
insufficient funds to pay checks they have written and electronic
payments they have authorized, thus triggering the overdraft programs
the guidance proposes to cover. In addition, they are less likely to
realize how essential it is to promptly review their monthly statements
to look for errors such as multiple debits due to substitute check
glitches or unauthorized electronic transfers. Moreover, consumers
who are not well informed about alternatives, risks, and problems are
unable to pick the systems and products most appropriate to their needs
and financial resources.
For these reasons, the disclosure practices suggested in the intera-
gency proposal should be considered in the context of payment
products and systems. Currently, a consumer who uses a stored value
card is entitled to no disclosures under federal law. 115 Furthermore,
few states require disclosures for gift and phone cards. 116 Other types
of cards are not regulated at all in any state.
2. Liability for Unauthorized Use and Error Resolution
If a wrongdoer forges the consumer's signature on a check, uses
a counterfeit check, forges an endorsement, or alters the amount of
the check, the consumer has no liability. 11 7 Although this "zero
114 Id.
115In fact, no federal law applies to any aspect of the transaction.
116 E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9 (West 2003) (requiring disclosure
for prepaid phone cards); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 200A, § 5D (Law. Co-op. 2004)
(requiring disclosure for gift cards); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 396-i(3) (McKinney
1997) (same);WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.240.040 (West 2004) (same).
117 A check with those infirmities is not considered to be "properly payable." U.C.C.
§ 4-401(a) (2002). The consumer's bank should not have paid it and charged the
consumer's account, and if the bank did so, the bank must reimburse the consumer.
See id.
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liability" approach is strong protection for consumers, there is no
legally mandated error resolution procedure for enforcing this liability
rule. Therefore, if the bank refuses to comply with the rule, there is
no way for the consumer to exercise this protection short of going
to court (or arbitration if the deposit agreement so requires). Moreover,
consumers are exposed at least to partial loss if they do not exercise
ordinary care. "'s In addition, the zero liability rule does not apply if
the consumer fails to promptly notify the bank after receiving a
periodic statement. 119 Courts have permitted banks by contract to
require customers to report problems as quickly as two weeks from
when the statement was sent. 120
If the consumer did not agree to truncation, a substitute check was
involved, and there was an erroneous debit due to an unauthorized
transfer, Check 21 makes the bank liable to the consumer. 121 Whereas
the UCC requires the consumer to report unauthorized transfers
promptly and permits the bank to impose a short period for the
consumer to report, Check 21 permits the consumer to take up to forty
days to notify the bank of an unauthorized transfer. 122 At the same
time, however, Check 21 imposes other requirements upon the
consumer submitting a claim to the bank that are far more onerous
than the UCC. 123 Unlike the UCC zero liability rule, Check 21
requires the bank to engage in an investigation and requires a recredit
to the consumer's account if the bank cannot determine whether or
not the claim is valid within ten days while it continues the investiga-
tion. 1 24
If there is unauthorized use of a credit card, the consumer's liability
is capped at $50 and could be as little as zero if the consumer reports
the theft or loss of a card before the thief has used the card to make
any purchases. 125 For unauthorized use of a debit card or other
118Id. § 3-406(b).
119 Id. § 3-406(a). The consumer's failure to exercise ordinary care must "substan-
tially contribute" to the failure in order for the consumer to be responsible for any
of the loss that occurred. Id. U.C.C. § 4-406(c) requires the consumer to notify the
bank "promptly" after examining receiving the monthly statement. Id. § 4-406(c).
120 See, e.g., Borowski v. FirstarBank Milwaukee, 579 N.W.2d 247, 252-53 (Wisc.
Ct. App. 1998).
121 12 U.S.C. § 5005(a) (2000).
122 Compare U.C.C. § 4-406(c) with 12 U.S.C. § 5006(a)(2).
123 Compare U.C.C. § 4-406(c) with 12 U.S.C. § 5006(b)(1).
124 Compare U.C.C. § 3-406(a) with 12 U.S.C. § 5006(c)(2)(B).
125 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b)(1) (2005).
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electronic fund transfer access device, the consumer is liable for up
to $50 for the two days following the time when the consumer should
have-realized the card was lost or stolen, and up to $500 thereafter,
until sixty days after the monthly statement on which unauthorized
transactions appear. 126 After those sixty days, the consumer's liability
is limited only by the amount in the consumer's account and any credit
limit on that account. 127 If the unauthorized electronic fund transfer
did not involve an access device, only the sixty-day rule applies; the
consumer has zero liability until the sixty days have passed. 128 Unless
the amount of loss is substantial or small claims court is a viable
alternative, a lawsuit will be financially impractical. 129
If the transaction involves a substitute check, however, Check 21
provides that consumers who did not agree to truncation can force
their banks to investigate alleged errors and recredit their accounts
up to $2500 if the bank cannot resolve the consumer's complaint
within ten days. 130 Check 21 even requires a consumer awareness
notice informing consumers of the error resolution procedure. 13 1
Nevertheless, Check 21 may put the error resolution procedure beyond
the reach of many consumers by imposing strict requirements on
consumers when they file a claim. 132 Unless the claim contains all
the required information, banks may refuse to initiate the error
resolution procedure.
If the consumer uses a credit card, Reg. Z permits consumers to
withhold their payments until the issuer resolves the consumer's
complaint. 133 Reg. Z also includes a comprehensive fair credit billing
126 Id. § 205.6(b)(2).
127 Id. § 205.6(b)(3).
128 Id. An example of an unauthorized electronic fund transfer not involving an
access device is a preauthorized electronic fund transfer. See id. § 205.10 (providing
rules governing preauthorized transfers).
129 Rubin, The Code, supra note 25, at 22 (arguing that numerous factors deter
consumers from obtaining remedies for violations of the UCC).
130 12 U.S.C. § 5006(c) (2000).
131 Id. § 5011(a)(2).
132 Id. § 5006(b)(1) (requiring consumers to describe their claim, including why
the substitute check was not properly charged to the consumer's account or why there
is a warranty claim, a statement that the consumer suffered loss as well as an estimate
of the amount of the loss, the reason why the original check or a better copy of the
original is necessary to determine the warranty claim or the validity of the charge
to the consumer's account, and adequate information for the bank to identify the
substitute check and conduct an investigation).
133 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c).
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dispute resolution procedure which must be disclosed to the consum-
er.134 If the consumer uses a debit card, the consumer has no right
comparable to the credit cardholder's right to withhold payment,
although Reg. E does include a detailed error resolution procedure for
electronic fund transfer disputes.135
In most states, by contrast, if the consumer uses a stored value card,
there is no legislatively mandated error resolution procedure. 136 This
situation presents a serious gap. Many cards are targeted at vulnerable
populations who are not well-equipped to assert their claims and
defenses without legal mandates in place for error resolution. These
groups include young people,' 3 7 the poor,138 people with no bank
accounts, 139 and immigrants. 140
1341d. § 226.13.
135 Id. § 205.11. See Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Internet Payment Intermediaries,
82 Tex. L. Rev. 681, 694 (2004) (questioning the appropriateness of providing the
right to withhold for credit cardholders but not for debit cardholders).
136 California's statute on prepaid phone cards requires the issuer to maintain a
toll-free customer telephone number staffed by a live operator at all times so
consumers can submit complaints and obtain information. CAL. Bus. & PROF'L CODE
§ 17538.9 (West 2003).
137 Susan Parrott, Who's il Charge?; To Some, Kids' Purchase Cards Are a Tool;
Foes Fear They Lead to Lifelong 'Debt,' DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 26, 2004
(reporting that consumer groups warn that Hello Kitty cards are "a savvy marketing
trick" to attract children); Mike Wendland, Hello Kitty, Hello Debit Card for Girls,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 22, 2004 (reporting that the Hello Kitty card is targeted
at girls from eight years of age); Bryony Gordon, Who's on the Scent of a Nice Little
Earner? Cliff Richardson's Latest Release Is a "Romantic" Perfume, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Oct. 13, 2004 (reporting that the Usher card targets people under eighteen
who cannot qualify for credit cards).
138 Said, supra note 83 (publisher of payment system newsletter claims that compa-
nies target the poor and charge them excessive fees).
139 Furletti, supra note 93, at 10 (payroll cards are marketed to employers of work-
ers who do not have bank accounts).
140 Yolanda Rodriguez, Bank on It; Latinos Can Count on Being Wooed As a Red-
Hot, Untapped Market Segment, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Aug. 18, 2004
(describing Bank of America's SafeSend, a stored value card with a Visa logo that
can be used to send funds to Mexico); Oscar Avila, Phone-Card Scams Slammed;
Officials Warn of Hidden Costs, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 2003 (reporting on phone cards
targeting immigrants; claiming that some issuers are undercapitalized, some cards have
hidden fees, and government agencies have brought enforcement actions accusing
issuers of deceptive advertising and fraud).
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3. Similar Problems of Non-Uniformity in the Context of
Payment Systems
When consumers use a variety of payment products, differences -
in disclosures, requirements, notices of rights, liability for unautho-
rized use, and error resolution - proliferate and confusion intensifies.
Payment systems pose similar problems of non-uniformity. If a
consumer pays exclusively by check, consumer rights and responsibili-
ties differ vastly, depending upon whether a substitute check is
involved and Check 21 applies. Check 21 itself applies different
disclosure, zero liability and error resolution standards to different
consumers. The inevitable confusion which results from such disparate
treatment damages consumer confidence and discourages consumers
from trying new payment products and systems. 141
IV. A Proposed Uniform Law
The preceding discussion demonstrates that consumers need a new
statute to ameliorate the present consumer confusion and legal chaos.
Although many believe that it is more efficient to let the competitive
marketplace work things out,1 42 moderate statutory action seems
necessary and more compatible with the present regulatory environ-
ment. As Professor Silber has advocated, "[rieplacing a market
mechanism by a regulatory mechanism should depend on whether an
intrinsic market weakness exists - including within that concept
consumers' cognitive limitations - and whether regulation is more
effective and efficient than the forces of the marketplace." ' 43 Due to
the tremendous complexity of modern payment systems and the
bewildering array of applicable laws, consumers have difficulty
141 See generally Mark Furletti & Stephen Smith, The Laws, Regulations, and In-
dustry Practices That Protect Consumes Who Use Electronic Payment Systems: Credit
and Debit Cards, Jan. 2005, available at www.phil.frb.org. (concluding their study
by finding "that the consumer protections associated with credit and debit cards are
complicated, largely inaccessible, and disparate").
142 Judith Rinearson, Regulation of Electronic Stored Value Payment Products Is-
sued By Non-Banks Under State Money Transmitter "Licensing Laws," 58 Bus. LAW.
317, 347, n. 114 (2002) (claiming that regulation of stored value products would retard
development of an industry that could make the nation's payment system more
efficient); David G. Oedel, Why Regulate Cybermoney?, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1075,
1097 (1997) (arguing that the cybermoney market is too new to be regulated; that
historically new payment systems are not regulated until they have established an
efficient prototype).
143 Norman I. Silber, Observing Reasonable Consumers: Cognitive Psychology, Con-
sumer Behavior and Consumer Law, 2 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 69, 74 (1990).
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understanding their rights and responsibilities, and determining what
payment systems are best for them. The situation is comparable to
that which consumers faced prior to the Truth-in-Lending Act, a law
that made the complexity of comparing interest rates and other charges
far more manageable for consumers. l4 In such an environment, the
marketplace cannot work efficiently absent some regulation because
consumers cannot reasonably obtain the information necessary to make
rational choices. 145
For the most part, the uniform law proposed below would not
encroach on previously unregulated transactions. Rather, the proposed
measures would function primarily to introduce greater consistency
and uniformity to the regulation that presently exists. 146 These reforms
will inure to the benefit of the financial services industry, as well as
to consumers. Greater protection will instill consumer trust and
confidence. Uniformity and universality will lessen consumer confu-
sion. As a result, consumers will be more willing to try new payment
products and adapt to the inevitable increase in the use of electronic
payment systems.
A. General Principles
Three principles should be followed in the implementation of the
new law. First, consumers need universal protection - they should
be protected regardless of the type of payment product they use and
the system through which the payment is processed. To enable
universal protection, stored value cards should not remain largely
unregulated. 147 In addition, important consumer protection for elec-
tronic payments should not reside solely in the NACHA rules. Second,
consumers need uniformity, that is, one rule or procedure that applies
regardless of the payment system or product, to the extent this is
practicable. Third, the new law should not result in the loss of
consumer protection established in current law.
144 1d. at 72-73.
145 Silber has described the various limitations on the consumer's cognition includ-
ing the time and expertise necessary to understand complex information. Id. at 72.
146 The proposal does involve adding some federal regulation where none presently
exists, such as an error resolution procedure in all check transactions and federal
regulation of limited aspects of stored value cards. To some extent, however, those
transactions are already regulated; Check 21 mandates error resolution for many check
transactions and the FRB proposes to regulate one type of stored value card, the payroll
card.
147 Avila, supra note 140 ("When there aren't regulations, everyone has a party.")
(quoting the vice-president of a phone card producer).
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Given that current payment law exists primarily on the federal
level, 148 reforms should be implemented through federal law. The
primary state law is UCC Article 4, which has been modified to be
consistent with federal law. Change has been rapid, and inevitably,
the law will have to be amended to adjust to new developments.
However, enacting a uniform state law is a long and arduous process,
and states often adopt non-uniform amendments. A federal law that
delegates rule-making authority to the FRB would solve that problem.
By issuing an advanced notice of proposed rule-making, the FRB can
solicit comments from affected parties and make necessary adjust-
ments within a relatively short time period. Subsequent modifications
can be made through the FRB's official staff interpretations.
At the same time, states should not be frozen out of this arena. States
vary greatly in the characteristics of their populations and the types
of financial services available. For example, some states have large
numbers of residents for whom Spanish is the primary language, while
other states have many elderly residents. Access to financial services
in rural Montana is different than in New York City. Individual states
should be able to require extra safeguards as they feel necessary to
account for these local factors. Furthermore, even among states with
similar populations and financial services, different approaches may
be suitable. Especially in an era of momentous change, the states can
serve as a laboratory for experimenting with various ways to tackle
a problem. 149 To some extent, state law that provides greater rights
in areas covered by the federal statute detracts from uniformity. But,
as discussed below, states should be permitted to enact laws that raise
the bar when their legislators and courts determine that consumers
148 Payment systems, for example, are governed by the Truth in Lending provisions
on credit cards, the EFTA, Check 21, Reg. CC. See discussion supra Part III.A. Also,
although not federal law, the NACHA Rules have uniform national application. See
generally Rubin, supra note 44.
149 In arguing against a "National Commercial Code," Professor Overby contends
that "state-by-state enactment [of commercial law] has the benefit of allowing states
to experiment with the Code and with other state legislation to address local mercantile
practices or contract issues that might not be widespread nationally. This allows for
individually-tailored law that still accomplishes the underlying federalism goals of
the UCC." A. Brooke Overby, Modeling UCC Drafting, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 645,
686 (1996). See Letter from Helen P. Howell, Director, Dept. of Financial Institutions,
State of Washington, to John D. Hawke, Jr., Office of Comptroller of the Currency
(Oct. 3, 2003) (arguing against OCC preemption and noting that "[tihe states have
historically been a model of innovation in the area of financial services regulation
• . . However, the real strength of the states is local supervision") (on file with author).
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need greater protection. 150 This article proposes only a uniform
national floor, the basic minimum that consumers absolutely need. 151
B. Specific Recommendations
In creating uniformity, the proposed law should provide universal
coverage by defining payment systems and products broadly to include
checks, preauthorized drafts, electronic transfers, credit cards, and
stored value cards. Because of the widely different characteristics of
these products and the systems used to process payments made with
them, it likely will be necessary to make some exceptions to the
general rules. But to the extent possible, the rules should be applied
across the board. Otherwise, the goals of universality and uniformity
will not be met.
For example, the rule should provide uniform protection from
unauthorized use. The $50 cap in the Truth in Lending Act is generally
understood by consumers and is easy to apply. 1 52 It should be the
general rule. The UCC's rule asserting that consumers are not liable
for any amount due to forgery or alteration should be retained. 153 The
$50 rule should apply to some types of stored value cards, such as
payroll cards. 154 However, as suggested in the Model Stored Value
150-Consumer protection law typically establishes federal minimum standards while
permitting states to ensure greater protection. Jean Braucher, Rent-Seeking and Risk-
Fixing in the New Statutory Law of Electronic Commerce: Difficulties in Moving
Consumer Protection Online, 2001 WIs. L. REV. 527, 560-561.
151 The EFTA illustrates the type of balancing contemplated by this article. The
EFTA permits states to enact their own laws as long as they are not inconsistent with
the EFTA. 15 U.S.C. § 1693q (2000). Under the EFTA, a state law is not considered
"inconsistent" if it provides consumers with greater protection than the EFTA
provides. Id. Another example is the various approaches states have taken to customer
requests for copies of checks in a truncated environment.
152 Id. § 1643(a). In contrast, the EFTA's scheme is baffling. Under the EFTA,
the consumer's liability is capped at $50 if the consumer informs the financial
institution within two business days after learning of a card's loss or theft. 12 C.F.R.
§ 205.6(b) (2005). The cap jumps to $500 thereafter if the consumer does not notify
within two days and the institution establishes the transfers would not have occurred
if the consumer had notified it within two days. Id. There is no cap on liability for
transfers later than sixty days after the institution sends a periodic statement if the
consumer fails to report unauthorized use within the sixty days and the institution
can establish that the loss would not have occurred if the consumer had notified the
institution within the sixty-day period. Id.
153 Consumers are liable, however, if they fail to exercise ordinary care, U.C.C.
§ 3-406(b) (2002), or fail to report forged drawer signatures or alterations promptly.
Id. § 4-406(d).
154 In supporting its proposal to extend Reg. E coverage to payroll cards, the FRB
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Card Protection Act, there should be an exception for cards whose
remaining amount on the card cannot reasonably be determined since
the issuer cannot stop the thief from access to the funds.155
Consumers also need an error resolution procedure, regardless of
payment system or product. Error should be defined broadly to include
billing errors, defective cards, unauthorized use of a card or account
number, erroneous debits, incorrect amounts received from electronic
terminals, and unauthorized types of processing. 156 Requiring an error
resolution procedure would mainly affect checks not subject to Check
21 and stored value cards. Furthermore, the consumer should be able
to easily invoke the error resolution procedure. For this reason, the
Check 21 requirements for submitting a claim should be repealed
where they impose intolerable burdens on consumers. 157 The "four
walls" rule of the EFTA should also be repealed because it unduly
limits the scope of the financial institution's investigation.15 8 There
should be one rule dictating the length of time a consumer has to notify
the financial institution. It is unfair and confusing to consumers to
have a forty-day rule for Check 21, a sixty-day rule for electronic
transfers, and a UCC rule whose vagueness permits banks to impose
a far shorter time by agreement.1 59
noted, inter alia, that the salaries paid through payroll cards often represent the "bulk
of the consumer's income" and the cards use the same types of access devices,
electronic terminals, and other EFT services as traditional electronic transfers. Reg.
E Proposed Amendment, supra note 38, at 55,999.
1 55 See MODEL STORED VALUE CARD PROTECTION ACT, in BUDNITZ, supra note
34, at 397-99 (requiring a receipt only if the transaction is for $5 or more; requiring
the issuer to reimburse the consumer for damage to the card, but only if the funds
remaining on the card can be determined). See also BUDNITZ & FREEMAN SAUNDERS,
supra note 70, at 398 & n. 16. The N.Y. Attorney General persuaded seventeen national
retailers to provide policy exceptions for certain lost or stolen gift cards. Press Release,
supra note 82. Under the agreement, the retailers will reissue lost or stolen gift cards
if the consumer provides evidence that they purchased a lost or stolen card. Id. The
policy also would apply to damaged cards. Id.
156 An example of an unauthorized type of processing is where a consumer sends
a check to a lockbox, and the merchant processes the payment as an electronic check
conversion without proper notice to the consumer. 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)-3 official
interpretation (2005) (stating that to qualify as an authorized electronic check
conversion, the consumer must receive notice).
157 Budnitz, supra note 15, at 374-75 (describing the requirements for submitting
a claim).
158 The FRB recently proposed clarifying the "four walls" rule, but not extending
it beyond the "four walls." Reg. E Proposed Amendment, supra note 38, at 55,997.
159 Borowski v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, 579 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998)
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The recredit right under the EFTA and Check 21 should be extended
to all types of payment systems. 160 Both statutes require the financial
institution to recredit the consumer's account if it cannot determine
the validity of the consumer's claim of an erroneous transfer within
ten days. 161 However, the recredit right under Check 21 is subject
to a $2500 limit, whereas the ETFA imposes no such cap. 162 Given
the similarity between electronic check conversion, subject to the
EFTA, and Check 21 transactions, Check 21's $2500 restriction,
should be repealed. A consumer who writes a check for over $2500
has just as great a need for the full amount to be recredited as a
consumer who writes a check for a smaller amount. It is likely that
banks will object, however, contending that the $2500 limit is needed
to protect against fraudulent claims. But the vast majority of consumer
checks are for far less than $2500.163 Furthermore, if this is a real
concern, banks will have an incentive to resolve claims involving
checks in higher amounts within the ten days in order to avoid having
to recredit. In addition, like Reg. CC, Check 21 includes bank
safeguards for risky accounts. 164
As discussed previously, the NACHA rules include several provi-
sions that grant consumers greater protection than they have under
the EFTA. 165 Those rules should be incorporated into Reg. E. Where
(holding that banks may impose a period as short as fourteen days); BARKLEY CLARK
& BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS
10.05[l][c][i] (5th ed. 2004).
160 See Cooter & Rubin, The Code, supra note 25, at 116 (arguing that banks should
be required to reverse charges that consumers claim are erroneous). The recredit right
would have no applicability to credit transactions where consumers have not yet paid
anything. The rules in the Truth in Lending Act permitting withholding serve a
comparable purpose and should be retained. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c) (allowing
cardholder to withhold payment up to the amount of credit outstanding for the property
or service that caused the dispute as well as any other charges imposed on that amount).
Those rules with limited applicability to transactions within the state or within 100
miles should be reconsidered. Id. § 226.12(c)(3).
161 12 U.S.C. § 5007 (2002) (Check 21); 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(c) (EFTA).
162 See discussion supra note 19.
163 The average value of checks paid by financial institutions varies considerably
because larger institutions maintain both commercial and consumer deposit accounts,
whereas credit union data reflect only consumer accounts. Geoffrey R. Gerdes & Jack
K. Walton 11, The Use of Checks and Other Noncash Payment Instruments in the
United States, 88 FED. RES. BULL. No. 8 360, 363 (2002). The average value of credit
union checks in 2000 varied depending on the size of the credit union, from. a high
of $208 to a low of $178. Id.
164 See 12 U.S.C. § 5006(d)(2) (2000).
165 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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the FRB otherwise lacks the authority to bring them into Reg. E, the
EFTA should be amended to include them. This should be done for
the following reasons. First, it is more appropriate for uniform national
consumer protection rules to be issued by the government, not a private
body. The government relinquishes its rightful role when it allows a
private body to do this. 166 In addition, NACHA can repeal or amend
its rules at any time, without any prior notice or hearing afforded to
consumers or the government.167 Furthermore, most of NACHA's
consumer protection rules do not require disclosures to consumers
informing them of their rights. 168 Therefore, consumers have no way
to know about and how to take advantage of those rights. The proposed
uniform law should require disclosure of consumers' rights. Finally,
it is not clear that consumers can use a business' violation of the
NACHA rules as a cause of action in a lawsuit. 169
Non-financial institutions such as merchants are intimately involved
in many payment systems. Therefore, to the extent appropriate, the
proposed law should impose requirements on those businesses as well
as financial institutions. 170 For example, when a consumer disputes
an electronic transfer and the bank cannot locate the source of the
problem within its own four walls, the bank's investigation should
include an inquiry of other parties to the transfer, including the
merchant. Furthermore, the law should require the merchant to assist
the bank in its investigation.1 7 1 The FRB has acknowledged its
166 The Association of Credit and Collection Professionals International also is con-
cemed that the differences between Reg. E and the NACHA rules "[undermine] the
authority of the FRB and the integrity of the electronic payments process." Letter
from Valerie L. Hayes, Legal Counsel, Director, Internet & Check Services Program,
ACA International, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System 6 (Nov. 19, 2004), available at www.federalreserve.gov/
SECRS/2004/November/20041123/R-121OIR-1210_81_l.pd Unlike the proposed
law, however, ACA International opposes incorporating NACHA's greater consumer
protection, and would remove NACHA's rulemaking role altogether. See id. ("The
FRB should not allow another organization to develop rules for utilizing the electronic
payment process.").
167 See supra notes 73, 75-76 and accompanying text.
168 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
169 Id.
170 See Mann, supra note 135, at 681 (recommending regulation of third party inter-
mediaries operating Internet payment services such as PayPal).
171 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(i) (2000) (requiring furnishers of
information to consumer reporting agencies to conduct an investigation when a
consumer disputes the completeness or accuracy of the information the furnisher
supplied to a consumer reporting agency); 12 U.S.C. § 5005(e)(3) (requiring
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authority to do this under the EFTA. 172 Likewise, the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act's privacy provisions demonstrate such authority with its
very broad definition of "financial institution." 173
The periodic statement will become increasingly important as ever
more types of products and systems are developed and payments are
processed more and more quickly. Consumers' demand deposit
accounts act as a financial hub. Moving in and out of that hub are
debits and credits resulting from their use of many types of payment
products traveling along various types of transfer systems. Consumers
need an accurate and comprehensible statement that enables them to
identify errors and to report those errors within the applicable time
limits. 174 In order for the statement to satisfy the consumer's needs,
it is essential that items be clearly designated on the statement. At
present, there is no standardized way to identify transactions on a
periodic statement. Consequently, consumers may have difficulty
identifying transactions. For example, consumers may not be able to
easily determine what payments were made through electronic check
conversion, and which by other processing methods.17 5 As a result,
those customers will have difficulties determining the existence and
source of errors on their statements. The proposed law should delegate
to the FRB the task of issuing a rule establishing standardized terms
for periodic statements.
The proposed law should limit the fees that can be assessed for
certain items. Examples include requests for substitute checks or
indemnified parties to assist indemnifying bank in connection with claims the bank
brings against a warrantor).
172 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 205. (2005) (Reg. E) (requiring merchants and other payees
to obtain a consumer's authorization for an electronic check conversion).
173 For purposes of the privacy provisions of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, "financial insti-
tution" includes check cashers, travel agencies operated in connection with financial
services, collection agencies, credit counselors, and tax preparation firms. See 16
C.F.R. § 313.1(b).
174 U.C.C. § 4-406(c) (2002) (requiring a customer to examine the statement with
'reasonable promptness" and notify the bank of forgeries and alterations "promptly");
12 U.S.C. § 5006(a)(2) (Check 21) (requiring consumer to submit a claim for a
recredit within forty days of the date the bank delivers a statement or makes the
substitute check available); 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(a)(2)(b) (Reg. E.) (requiring the
consumer to notify the bank of errors within sixty days after the bank sends the
statement).
175 For example, a major regional bank designates payments made through elec-
tronic check conversion on its monthly statement as "automated checks." See
Wachovia Statement (on file with author).
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truncated checks, requests for documentation, and fees for investigat-
ing claims. A separate section of the proposed law should deal with
fees on stored value cards, with subsections for gift cards, phone cards,
and payroll cards. Alternatively, the statute should give the FRB the
authority to develop disclosure requirements and limitations in regard
to fees and practices that impose additional costs even if they are not
in the nature of fees. For example, for gift cards, the statute or FRB
regulations should deal with activation fees, dormancy fees, monthly
service fees, and redemption fees. In addition, regulations should
require issuers to permit consumers to redeem unused funds and
provide reasonable periods before cards expire.
The proposed law should require financial institutions and others
issuing payment products to disclose to consumers their rights under
the law. 176 The disclosures would notify consumers of their limited
liability for unauthorized use, the limits on fees, their right to dispute
charges to their accounts and demand an investigation, their recredit
right, and how to invoke these entitlements. Congress should require
the FRB to examine the need for further disclosures to provide
consumers with information about product alternatives, and the risks
and problems consumer may encounter in using various products and
systems. 177
Some businesses may want to make the disclosures required by the
proposed law electronically. The federal Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act (the "E-Sign Act") includes an
important provision requiring consumer authorization before a busi-
ness can send notices mandated by the law electronically.17 8 The
proposed law should clearly incorporate the consumer authorization
requirement. The E-Sign Act should be amended to make it clear that
the authorization requirement applies even if a state has enacted the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act. In addition, Check 21 should
176 Federal agencies proposed required disclosures for stored value cards several
years ago. See, e.g., Electronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,700 (proposed
May 2, 1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 205). See Budnitz, Stored Value Cards,
supra note 82, at 1069. See generally Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer
E-Commerce as an Unfair or Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805 (2000);
William C. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure in Consumer Transactions, 1973
Wis. L. REV. 400 (1973).
177 The federal regulatory agencies have proposed disclosures of alternatives, risks,
and problems in regard to overdraft protection programs. See supra notes l10-114
and accompanying text
178 See Check 21 Final Rule, supra note 5, at 47,303.
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be amended to state that E-Sign's consumer authorization rule applies
to checks subject to that act. 179
The disclosures and protections granted under the proposed law are
meaningless if the statute does not provide incentives for enforcement.
The statute should follow the scheme of the federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act and grant rule-making and enforcement powers to the
relevant state and federal government agencies. 180 In addition, consis-
tent with that scheme, the law should authorize a private right of
action, liability for actual damages, statutory damages, costs and
attorney's fees. 181 Finally, the statute should prohibit mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration. 182 Enforcement of the law must not be undermined
by allowing those who own the products and systems to relegate all
consumer disputes to a forum that often is costly and inconvenient.
The integrity of the national payments system depends on compliance
with the law. Mandatory pre-dispute arbitration undermines that
integrity because arbitrators are not required to follow the law and
decisions cannot be appealed.
The proposed uniform law is intended as a first step only. Consum-
ers need far more protection than is recommended here. Some of that
protection, however, cannot be provided by a uniform law with
universal coverage. Stored value cards are a prime example. There
are striking differences among phone cards, gift cards and payroll
179 In its Final Rule on Check 21, the FRB claimed that the consumer authorization
requirements of the E-Sign Act did not apply to Check 21 because Check 21 contains
its own rules and does not refer to E-Sign. Id. at 47,303.
180 See infra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act and state preemption).
181 The law should not include artificial restrictions on consumer remedies. For
example, Check 21 restricts its indemnity provision to those who are recipients of
substitute checks. 12 C.F.R § 229.53 (2005). See Check 21 Final Rule, supra note
5, at 47,324. Consumers need the relief made available by the indemnity provision
when they suffer damages due to a transaction involving a substitute check whether
or not they received a substitute check.
182 See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" To Arbitrate
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2004); Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory
Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (2004); Jean R. Sternlight
& Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration To Eliminate Consumer Class Actions:
Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
75 (2004); Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer
Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1237 (2001). A comprehensive
critique of mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration is beyond the scope of this
article.
CONSUMER PAYMENT PRODUCTS & SYSTEMS
cards. Additional individualized legislation is needed to deal with
unique characteristics of certain products and systems.
C. Preemption
As discussed, a federal law is needed to reduce the consumer
confusion and legal chaos that characterize the present payment
system. In order to accomplish the objective of providing a uniform
minimum level of consumer protection to all consumers, any federal
law setting a minimum standard should preempt state law that does
not provide that level of protection. Under the proposed uniform law,
however, states would be permitted to enact laws that provide consum-
ers greater protection. In fashioning a preemption rule for the proposed
law, it is helpful to understand the role preemption plays in consumer
protection statutes, recent federal regulatory actions, and challenges
that can be expected from industry.
All of the subparts of the Consumer Credit Protection Act include
provisions preempting state law. 183 These provisions offer a model
for the proposed uniform federal law. The typical preemption provision
provides that the federal law does not exempt any person from
complying with state law "except to the extent those laws are
inconsistent with any provision of [the federal law], and then only to
the extent of the inconsistency." 1 84 Under these preemption provi-
sions, the FRB is authorized to determine whether state law is
inconsistent. 185 Some of the provisions explicitly provide that a state
183 See Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16660) (2000); Truth in Lending Act,
id. § 1610(a)(1); Consumer Leasing Act, id. § 1667e(a); Credit Repair Organizations
Act, id. § 16790); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, id. § 1691f; Debt Collection
Practices Act, id. § 1692(n); Electronic Fund Transfers Act, id. § 1693(q). Professor
Overby likely would characterize this arrangement as "cooperative federalism." A.
Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMPLE L. REV. 297,
328 (2003) ("Movements toward more purely cooperative federalism schemes, which
rely less upon preemption and displacement than on the creation of joint federal-state
regulatory regimes, also have begun to arise in commercial law areas.").
184 See, e.g., Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16660) (2000); Truth in Lending
Act, id. § 1610(a)(1); Consumer Leasing Act, id. § 1667e(a); Credit Repair Organiza-
tions Act, id. § 16790); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, id. § 1691f; Debt Collection
Practices Act, id. § 1692(n); Electronic Fund Transfers Act, id. § 1693(q). Professor
Overby likely would characterize this arrangement as "cooperative federalism." A.
Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMPLE L. REV. 297,
328 (2003) ("Movements toward more purely cooperative federalism schemes, which
rely less upon preemption and displacement than on the creation of joint federal-state
regulatory regimes, also have begun to arise in commercial law areas.").
185 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 16660).
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law is not inconsistent if the FRB "determines that such law gives
greater protection to the consumer."18 6
Recent legislative developments, however, may be a harbinger of
what could happen to the proposed law as a result of the preemption
controversy. Battles over preemption issues stalled the enactment of
amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the "FRCA"). Industry
wanted broad preemption so they would not have the burden of having
to comply with more than one set of laws - including those of states
granting consumers greater protection. 8 7 Consumer advocates be-
lieved that consumers who lived in states that provided greater
protection than the FRCA should have the benefit of those state
laws. '88 The end result is a very complex partial preemption scheme.
While the FRCA's preemption section contains a provision permitting
state laws that are not inconsistent, 189 there is an extensive list of
exceptions, 1o and even exceptions to those exceptions.' 9 '
Further complicating the partial federal preemption scheme of the
federal consumer protection statutes, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (the "OCC") has largely exempted national banks from
having to comply with state law. The OCC's regulation provides that
state laws that "obstruct, impair or condition a national bank's ability
to exercise its. . deposit-taking powers are not applicable." 192 Other
rules preempt state laws that interfere with a national bank's lending
powers.1 93 Finally, the OCC has claimed exclusive "visitorial powers"
over not only national banks, but also their operating subsidiaries. 94
186 d.
187 Rob Blackwell, How Measure May Alter Path for FCRA Renewal, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 20, 2003 (reporting that the president of the Financial Services Roundtable
preferred a tough national standard if it was accompanied by preemption that obviated
compliance with many different state laws). The Bush administration also supported
preemption. See Michelle Heller, White House's Support for FCRA Comes at Price,
AM. BANKER, July 1, 2003 (quoting Treasury Secretary John W. Snow's statements
supporting preemption and national uniform standards).
188 See generally Blackwell, supra note 187 (reporting that because California had
passed a strong privacy law, Senators Shelby and Sarbanes would not support FCRA
preemption).
189 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a).
190 Id. § 1681 t(b).
191 Id. §§ 1681t(b)(l)(F), (b)(2).
192 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007(b)(1) (2005).
193 Id. §§ 7.4008(d)(1), 34.3.
194 Id. § 7.4000.
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The proposed uniform law arguably conflicts with the OCC's
preemption rules to the extent the law would permit states to require
national banks to provide greater protection than the proposed uniform
law to consumers paying by check. 195 Arguably, however, the OCC's
previously-issued interpretations have resolved any such problems.
Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC, as adopted by the states, regulate
payments by check and define the rights and responsibilities of the
parties when problems arise in check transactions. 196 NCCUSL and
ALI, the organizations that sponsored the UCC were concerned that
the OCC's regulation preempted Article 4.197 Responding to these
concerns, the OCC has taken the position that the UCC "does not
obstruct, impair or condition the ability of national banks to exercise
fully the powers granted by federal law." 198 The proposed federal law
would apply to many of the same areas of check processing as the
UCC. Ostensibly, then, the OCC would not find that the proposed law
interferes with national banks' ability to exercise their powers under
other federal law.
D. The Consumer's Dilemma: Uniformity May Reduce
Consumer Protection
Congress might give serious consideration to a proposal by con-
sumer advocates to enact uniform federal legislation that would
guarantee basic consumer protection along the lines proposed in this
195 See supra text accompanying notes 149-151, proposing that banks be required
to provide consumers an error resolution procedure, while permitting states to mandate
greater consumer protection.
196 U.C.C. §§ 3-404, 3-405, 3-406, 4-406 (2002).
197 See NCCUSL, News Release, OCC Declares UCC Not Affected by New Fed-
eral Preemption Rule (June 25, 2004), available at www.nccusl.org/Update/
DesktopModules/NewsDisplay.aspx?ltemlD= 109 ("On May 12, 2004, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute
wrote to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) expressing concerns
about the impact of the recently promulgated OCC Rule concerning preemption of
state laws on the Uniform Commercial Code").
198 Letter from Julie L. Williams, First Senior Deputy Comptroller and Chief Coun-
sel, OCC, to Fred H. Miller, President, NCCUSL (June 10, 2004) (on file with author).
Lawsuits filed by the attorneys general of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New
Hampshire have forced the OCC to determine whether state laws on gift cards are
preempted. Hannah Bergman, Gift Card Case Has OCC Siding with States, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 17, 2004. The attorneys general allege that the Simon mall gift card
violates their states' laws on expiration dates and fees. Simon alleges that since the
card is issued by a national bank, state law is preempted. The OCC has said it does
not regard the card as a "bank product." Id.
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article. 199 In addition, although industry representatives likely would
not support many of the substantive consumer protection provisions
consumer advocates would recommend, they might welcome the
opportunity to have Congress consider the need for uniform legislation
so they could proffer their own model legislation.
If Congress were to consider the proposed uniform law and the
inevitable competing industry recommendations, Congress might
respond by enacting a law that provides too little consumer protection.
Past experience suggests that Congress could enact legislation that
effectively would undermine the objectives of those recommending
the type of law proposed in this article. For example, Congress might
be content to require only disclosure, rather than substantive protec-
tion. This was Congress's approach to the Truth in Lending Act 200
and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty - Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act. 20'
As was true in the battle over the amendments to the FCRA, industry
can be expected to urge Congress to include a strong preemption
provision as part of any uniform law governing payment systems. If
such a preemption clause were included along with a statute requiring
nothing more than minimal disclosures, consumers would end up with
less protection than at present. Currently, consumers in some states
199 The recent failure of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act to include con-
sumer protection demonstrates that consumers cannot rely on the uniform law process
to ensure rights. Braucher, supra note 176, at 531-32. Professor Braucher contends
that consumers have a greater chance at passing consumer protective legislation on
the federal level because lobbying one legislature is cheaper and the process is more
publicly exposed for review. Id. at 532.
200 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 (2005). The Truth in Lending Act offers little substantive
protection; it does not limit the interest or other charges creditors can impose, but
instead merely requires disclosure. See Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding,
and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act,
55 FLA. L. REv. 807, 884 (2003). Exceptions are the right to rescind transactions
in which a security interest is taken in the consumer's principal dwelling, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1635 (2000), and protections for high cost loans included in the Home Ownership
Equity Protection Act portions of the Truth in Lending Act. E.g., id. §§ 1639(c)-(h).
201 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commis-
sion Improvement Act is largely a disclosure statute that does not ensure that
consumers receive goods that perform in a manner commensurate with the price paid
by the consumer. An innovative feature of the act is its provision regarding alternative
dispute resolution. Id. § 2310; 16 C.F.R. § 703 (2005). The courts have substantially
undercut those provisions, however, by enforcing warrantors' mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses. E.g., Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268 (1 1th Cir.
2002); Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002).
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have the protection of strong phone and gift card laws. 20 2 If the
uniform law were to preempt those statutes, consumers in those states
would be left with less protection than they have now. In the long-term,
this would benefit neither consumers nor the industry. Without the
minimal protections proposed herein, consumers will continue to be
confused and will not have the confidence and trust in the newer
payment products and systems needed to ensure consumer acceptance.
Therefore, state law should be preempted only to the extent it is
inconsistent with the minimum guarantees mandated in the proposed
law. States would be permitted to enforce laws that grant consumers
greater protection.
The payments industry likely will object to this partial preemption
scheme, arguing that the benefits of uniformity are lost if states can
enact their own laws, requiring the industry to comply with several
sets of laws. In reality, however, the industry would not really be
substantially worse off than it is now. At the present time, the industry
must comply with several sets of laws. At the federal level it has to
comply with the different rules of Check 21, Reg. Z, and Reg. E; in
addition, it has to comply with the state-implemented versions of the
UCC.203 Even the UCC is riddled with non-uniform amendments,
requiring financial institutions operating in several states to apply
different rules to identical transactions. 204 The only difference is that
if the proposal were enacted, the industry would have to comply with
the minimum federal requirements. Such compliance would not be a
huge burden for many businesses. For example, it is likely that most
already provide some sort of error resolution procedure, even where
not required to do so by law. As noted above, the various subchapters
202 E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1749.5 (2005) (making it unlawful to sell a gift card
that contains an expiration date or a service fee, and providing that gift cards are
redeemable in cash or for replacement with a new gift certificate). But see CAL. CIv.
CODE § 1749.45 (excluding a gift card that can be used with multiple sellers if any
expiration date is printed on the card); IowA CODE § 556.9 (2003) (prohibiting
imposition of charges for the consumer's failure to present the gift certificate in a
timely manner unless permitted by an enforceable written contract); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 266, § 75C (2004) (imposing fines upon sellers of prepaid gift certificates that
impose redemption deadlines of less than seven years as well as upon sellers who
refuse to redeem the certificate before the expiration date occurs); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 255D, § 1 (defining "gift certificate" to include stored value cards); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 19.240.040 (West 2004) (imposing requirements for when a dormancy
or inactivity charge may be imposed).
203 See discussion supra Part III.C.
204 E.g., U.C.C. § 4-406 (2002). The variations are described in BuDNITZ & FREE-
MAN SAUNDERS, supra note 70, at 11.
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of the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act contain preemption
provisions that allow state laws as long as they are not inconsistent
with the federal law. 205 The lack of industry pressure to substitute
the current scheme with one providing for total preemption indicates
that the industry has not found it difficult to live with this type of
partial preemption.
There is another reason that the federal uniform law should not
preempt all state laws. At the present time the marketplace is very
dynamic, undergoing constant change as new payment products are
marketed. There are many suitable approaches to regulating these new
products, and the states can serve as valuable laboratories for experi-
menting with various regulatory schemes. Consequently, it would be
beneficial to permit states to try different regulatory strategies for some
period of time. Ultimately, it may be wise to preempt state law more
broadly in regard to some payment products. Those products may
reach a mature development stage, and Congress may then have
enough evidence of the success of various state regulatory schemes
to enable it to choose the optimal legislative solution to displace state
law. Until that time, however, Congress should adopt partial
preemption.
V. Conclusion
Due to the many significant recent changes in consumer payment
products, the systems that transfer payments and the law that governs
or fails to govern them, this country needs a uniform payments law
that would establish national minimum requirements. As far as
possible, the law should require uniform rules that would apply to all
types of payment systems. Under this optimal system, consumers
would not surrender rights they already have. The statute would
include a rule providing protection from unauthorized use, a mandated
error resolution procedure, a right to a recredit if the validity of the
consumer's dispute cannot be determined within ten days, a limit on
fees and disclosure of rights. The FRB would have the task of
developing standardized terms for periodic bank statements. NACHA
rules that establish important consumer protections would be incorpo-
rated into the uniform law. The proposed law would set forth the
absolute minimum that is needed. For this reason, and also because
of the dynamic nature of the current marketplace, states should be free
to adopt their own laws if they are not inconsistent with the federal
205 See supra Part IV.C.
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uniform statute. At some time in the future, when there is enough
experience with various legislative approaches, it may be appropriate
to have only one completely uniform law in regard to certain types
of payment products. But that should be a law that provides far more
protection than is proposed by this article.
Congressional consideration of a national uniform law is fraught
with risks. Congress might take to the basic idea of one universal
uniform law, but enact a law that requires only disclosure. Further-
more, Congress may enact a law that totally preempts states from
regulating payment products, thereby inhibiting the development of
the law. The resulting law would then provide only the most minimal
protection based on market conditions extant when the law was
enacted, contrary to the proposed law's original intent. These sugges-
tions are recommended only as a starting point. More protection will
be needed and adjustments will be essential as products and systems
mature and as new ones develop.

